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A Relational Critique of the Third
Restatement of Restitution § 39
David Campbell∗
Abstract
In the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,
breach of contract is regarded as a "wrong," and, in response to the
perceived shortcomings of the current law of remedies based on
compensatory damages, the proposed Section 39 seeks to provide for
disgorgement of profit as an alternative remedy for "opportunistic" breach.
In so doing, the Restatement is substantially repeating the argument for the
extension of restitutionary remedies for breach of contract which recently
has had great success in the Commonwealth. The restitutionary criticism of
compensatory damages is, at root, that those damages are unable to
prevent important forms of immoral or amoral contracting behaviour.
However, this Article argues that, viewed from the perspective of the
relational theory of contract, compensatory damages encourage a valuably
cooperative attitude towards dealing with problems which arise in the
course of contracting, and that Section 39 would undermine that attitude,
diminishing the moral quality of contracting.
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I. Introduction
In the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
(R3RUE),1 breach of contract is regarded as a "wrong," and in response to
certain perceived shortcomings of the current law of remedies based on
compensation of lost expectation, the proposed Section 39 seeks to extend
restitution to provide for disgorgement of profit as an alternative to
compensatory damages in cases of "opportunistic breach." In so doing,
R3RUE is substantially repeating the argument for the extension of
restitutionary remedies for breach of contract which has had considerable
success in the Commonwealth since the appearance of Goff and Jones’ The
Law of Restitution in 19662 and Birks’s An Introduction to the Law of
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) [hereinafter
R3RUE]. As this Article was written, R3RUE was set out in six Tentative Drafts, between
April 6, 2001 and March 12, 2008. A concluding, seventh tentative draft appeared on March
12, 2010, on which see infra note 11.
2. See ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 521–22 (7th ed.
2007) ("[C]ourts have not taken too kindly to opportunistic breach of contract. Their
readiness to strip the party in breach of his profits had to be concealed as an award of
damages. There is evidence that judges have become impatient with such fictions."
(citations omitted)).
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Restitution in 1985.3 Such has been the importance of the late Professor
Peter Birks in making this argument that I propose to call it the Birksian
argument, though this somewhat misdescribes Birks’s own interests, which
were never focused on contract, and is quite unfair to the contract
scholarship of Lord Goff, Professor Jones and many other contributors.4
The Birksian argument was gradually acknowledged in a number of cases
following Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. in 1974,5
and authoritatively endorsed by the, in terms of the formal law of damages,
revolutionary House of Lords’s decision in Attorney General v. Blake
(Jonathan Cape Third Party) in 2001.6
I have strongly criticised this development in the law of England and
Wales,7 and this Article is written to bring this criticism to the attention of a
U.S. audience which has "widely applauded" Section 39.8 I by no means
3. See PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 3 (rev. ed. 1989)
("[T]his book is pre-occupied with the task of finding the simplest structure on which the
material in Goff and Jones can hang.").
4. In his comments on the draft of this Article, Professor Kull has rightly pointed to
the way that many fundamentals of the Birksian argument were anticipated in the work of
Seavey and Scott, the Reporters of the first Restatement. As Kull is perfectly well aware, in
the British literature this point has been raised in criticism of Birks, who never engaged with
the Restatement in any real depth. See Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early
Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 298 n.2 (2005) ("A
restitution skeptic like Steve Hedley is similarly content to let the American Law Institute
take the credit—such as it is—for originating what he calls ‘the current view of the subject.’"
(citing STEVE HEDLEY, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO RESTITUTION 8–9 (2001))). Birks’s
most substantial, if this is the right word, comment on the Restatement was to criticise
Seavey and Scott, as he criticised everyone who had written on these matters prior to
himself, for adhering to "the tripartite division of the law into contract, tort and restitution."
Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1769
(2001) (quoting Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REV. 29, 31
(1938)); see also Peter Birks, A Letter to America: The New Restatement of Restitution, 3(2)
GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS art. 2 (2003) available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/
frontiers/vol3/iss2/art2 ("Intoxicating as the restitution excitement has been, it has from the
outset been seriously flawed. The evidence of the flaw is that the passage of 70 years has
not reconciled the common law to the simple classification of the causative events which
was introduced above . . . ."). On the specific point of "subtraction," see infra Part IV.
5. See Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798
(Ch.D.) (allowing for the recovery of 5% of the builder’s profits from the development of
land subject to a restrictive covenant not to develop).
6. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [1997] Ch. 84 (Ch.D.); [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.); [2001]
1 A.C. 268 (H.L.(E.)) (finding that an accounting for of profits was an appropriate remedy
for a former English Secret Intelligence Service member who wrote a book about his
experiences in the Service without first obtaining permission as required by contract).
7. I should make it clear that my thoughts on this subject have been formed in close
collaboration with a number of coauthors who are identified in citations infra.
8. James S. Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of
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wish to recapitulate all of this criticism but, rather, to focus on the, in my
opinion, simple issue that underlies the labyrinthine twists and turns taken
by the treatment of breach of contract in the Birksian argument. This issue
is whether the effective general permission of breach in the expectationbased law of remedies is a good policy. The Birksian argument has been
driven by a belief that it is not, indeed that it is seriously mistaken and gives
rise to immoral or amoral contracting behaviour. This has led to arguments
that a stronger remedy which will more effectively prevent breach is
needed; that restitutionary damages are such a remedy; and that the wider
availability of these damages will buttress the moral quality of the law of
contract.
The U.S. discussion is fortunate in that the excellent Comments and
Notes produced by the Reporter, Professor Andrew Kull of Boston
University School of Law, show that the argument for Section 39 is
ultimately concerned, not with abstract ratiocination,9 but with the practical
contribution Section 39 will make towards reinforcing "the stability of . . .
contract itself."10 The contrast with much of the Commonwealth discussion
is marked. In three valuable papers,11 Professor Caprice Roberts of West
Virginia University has examined what I believe is the issue on which the
"stability of contract" turns: the morality of breach.12 She discusses with
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 66 (2007).
9. I will mention, without detailed discussion, that on a number of occasions
Professor Kull has simply dismissed as "arid," or some synonym of arid, a number of
abstract talking points that have been thought to be of absorbing interest in the
Commonwealth debate.
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b
(2011).
11. I am afraid that serious illness prevented me from attending the symposium or
reading the contributions prior to the deadline for submission of this Article, so I have been
unable to make detailed reference to those contributions, including that of Professor Roberts.
For this reason, I was also unable to consider the seventh Tentative Draft, but have since
confirmed that it did not necessitate any alteration of my argument.
12. See generally Caprice Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary
Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945 (2008) [hereinafter
Roberts, Commonwealth of Perspective); Caprice Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131
(2008) [hereinafter Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement]; Caprice Roberts, Restitutionary
Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991 (2009)
[hereinafter Roberts, Moral Compass].
Roberts takes up a theme that has had only vestigial treatment in the Commonwealth
discussion. See, e.g., I.M. Jackman, Restitution for Wrongs, 1989 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 302, 302
("In what circumstances can a person be liable to a pecuniary remedy for conduct which has
not caused the plaintiff any harm? This question lies at the heart of the present topic . . . .").
She argues that enforceability is necessary for the institution of contract to work. I am sure
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skill certain relatively narrow points of remedies doctrine which
undoubtedly arise in connection with § 39, but which I will largely ignore.
However, she rightly puts this discussion in the context of the law of
mitigation, and she, even more rightly, relates all of this to the ethical
foundations of contract. By doing so, she has provided the opportunity for
the U.S. discussion of restitutionary remedies for breach of contract to be
conducted on a sounder footing than it has enjoyed for most of the time in
the Commonwealth.13
She is, however, in my opinion, wrong to think that expectation-based
remedies do not institutionalize a moral position. They do. It is a position
in which parties are encouraged to cooperate to deal with the consequences
of breach. This is, in fact, a far superior moral position to that which would
be established by the wider availability of restitutionary damages, which
would give an unbalanced and indefensible power to the plaintiff to
vindicate his formal rights, and so deny the ethic of cooperation at the heart
of the expectation-based law of remedies. I write, however, in the
conditional tense, for the wider availability of restitutionary damages so
conflicts with freedom of contract that it cannot be established without
extinguishing that freedom, and so, in my opinion, it has no chance
whatsoever of becoming settled law.
My argument amounts to a defense of the expectation-based law of
remedies.
I do not, however, wish to defend the conventional,
(neo)classical,14 understanding of that law, of which I am profoundly
she is right, but this does not mean that enforceability need be of the literal sort she
envisages. I do not want to go into the issue at all, but it is incumbent upon Roberts to
address the way that Durkheim, whose views are central to the discussion of this matter,
emphasizes that the modern form of solidarity is flexibly "organic" rather than rigidly
"mechanical," and, in my opinion, Durkheim’s account of modern solidarity readily
embraces the flexibility I will argue is brought to the law of remedies by compensatory
damages. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 149–78 (1984). An
excellent discussion of the issue within the legal literature is J.H. Gebhardt, Pacta Sunt
Servanda, 10 MOD. L. REV. 159 (1947).
13. A rare example of contribution to the Commonwealth literature which focused on
the effect of Blake on the practical operation of commercial law is Gillian Black, A New
Experience in Contract Damages? Reflections on Experience Hendrix v PPX Enter., 2005
JURID. REV. 31. I responded to Ms. Black’s paper in David Campbell, The Defence of
Breach and the Policy of Performance, 25 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 271 (2006).
14. I follow Ian Macneil’s distinction of classical and neo-classical conventional
contract thinking. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neo-Classical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV.
854, 855 n.2 (1978) ("Classical contract law refers . . . to that developed in the 19th century
and brought to its pinnacle . . . in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932). Neoclassical
contract law refers to a body of contract law founded on that system in overall structure but
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critical.15 I write from the intrinsically ethical perspective of the relational
theory of contract, to which I have sought to contribute for twenty-five
years, and my argument shares Roberts’s concern with the moral nature of
contract.
II. Section 39 and the Impulse Behind Restitutionary Remedies for Breach
Headed "Profit Derived from Opportunistic Breach," Section 39 reads:
1.

If a breach of contract is both material and opportunistic, the
injured promisee has a claim in restitution to the profit realized
by the defaulting promisor as a result of the breach. Liability
in restitution with disgorgement of profit is an alternative to
liability for contract damages measured by injury to the
promisee.

2.

A breach is "opportunistic" if

3.

a)

the breach is deliberate;

b)

the breach is profitable by the test of subsection (3);
and

c)

the promisee’s right to recover damages for the breach
affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s
contractual entitlement. In determining the adequacy
of damages for this purpose,
(i)

damages are ordinarily an adequate remedy if
they can be used to acquire a full equivalent to the
promised performance in a substitute transaction;
and

(ii)

damages are ordinarily an inadequate remedy if
they cannot be used to acquire a full equivalent to
the promised performance in a substitute
transaction.

A breach is "profitable" when it results in gains to the
defaulting promisor (net of potential liability in damages)
greater than the promisor would have realized from
performance of the contract. Profits from breach include saved
expenditure and consequential gains that the defaulting
promisor would not have realized but for the breach. The

considerably modifies in some . . . of its detail.").
15. See generally David Campbell, The Undeath of Contract, 22 HONG KONG L.J. 20
(1992).
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amount of such profits must be proved with reasonable
certainty.16

A (material) breach is, then, "opportunistic" when it is "deliberate,"
"profitable," and "the promisee’s right to recover damages for the breach
affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement."
The impulse behind this section, as in the development of the restitutionary
remedy in England and Wales, was the perception that expectation-based
damages can leave the plaintiff inadequately protected against profitable
breach, and that defendants will take advantage of this opportunity
profitably to breach.
As is pointed out in R3RUE,17 and as is dwelt on by Roberts in all
three of her papers, Section 39 will have important implications for the
concept of "efficient breach." I will argue that Kull’s and Roberts’s
criticisms of this vexed concept are somewhat ill-directed, but their
understanding perfectly fairly reflects the dominant treatment of it in
contract scholarship, which is, of course, derived from Posnerian law and
economics. Kull rightly tells us that in discussions of efficient breach, "it is
suggested" that "[t]he seller . . . ought to breach the contract whenever the
anticipated profits from resale at the higher price would be more than
sufficient to pay the buyer’s damages, thereby leaving some parties better
off and nobody worse off."18 Ensuring that "a person is not permitted to
profit by his own wrong" is one of the general principles of R3RUE,19 and
it is clear from the general discussion of restitution for wrongs that what is
at issue in Section 39 ultimately20 is a moral issue turning on this
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 2005). A subsection 4 adds:
Disgorgement by the rule of this Section will be denied: (a) if the parties’
agreement authorizes the promisor to choose between performance of the
contract and a remedial alternative such as payment of liquidated damages; or
(b) to the extent that disgorgement would result in an inappropriate windfall to
the promisee, or would otherwise be inequitable in a particular case.
Id. Kull’s substantial argument in earlier academic work stated, "[d]isgorgement awarding
the plaintiff more than he lost is justified in a narrow class of cases in which the defendant’s
election to breach imposes harms that a potential liability for provable damages will not
adequately deter." Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the Restitution Interest and the
Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2052 (2001).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h
(2011) ("The rationale of the disgorgement liability in restitution, in a contractual context or
any other, is inherently at odds with the idea of efficient breach in its usual connotation.").
18. Id.
19. Id. § 3.
20. See, e.g., id. § 3 cmt. c ("Restitution requires full disgorgement of profit by a
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principle.21 Roberts provides some highly interesting amplification of this
aspect of the thinking behind Section 39.22
Though, to my knowledge, the term efficient breach was coined as late
as 197723 and the first formal statement of the concept was made only in
1970,24 the concept is traceable to Holmes’s famous observation that "the
only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law
makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to
pass. [The law of contract] leaves [the promisor] free to break his contract
if he chooses."25 This "option" or "choice" theory of contractual obligation
is found objectionable by Kull and by Roberts, and by many, many others
of course, including, I have no doubt, the other contributors to this
symposium,26 because it articulates what is regarded as the amoral attitude
conscious wrongdoer, not just because of the moral judgment implicit in the rule of this
section, but because any lesser liability would provide an inadequate incentive to lawful
behavior.").
21. See, e.g., id. § 39 cmt. b ("In countering this form of opportunism, the rule of
Section 39 reinforces the contractual position of the vulnerable party and condemns a form
of conscious advantage-taking that is the equivalent, in the contractual context, of an
intentional and profitable tort.").
22. See, e.g., Roberts, Moral Compass, supra note 12, at 992 ("To say that we are
morally obligated to keep our promises means precisely that: that we are obligated. The
promise imposes an imperative from an earlier to a later self to be obeyed, not an option to
be weighed.").
23. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558 (1977) ("[M]odern . . . contract damages [are]
based on the premise that a contractual obligation is not necessarily an obligation to perform,
but rather an obligation to choose between performance and compensatory damages. . . . As
long as the compensation adequately mirrors the value of performance, this damage rule is
‘efficient.’" (citations omitted)).
24. See Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) ("Repudiation of obligations should be
encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in
as good a position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered. . . . To
penalize such adjustments . . . is to discourage efficient reallocation of community
resources.").
25. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881).
26. From within the relational perspective see Ian R. Macneil, A Primer of Contract
Planning, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 627, 692 (1975) ("Inevitably the contract’s contents are no
longer the same once mutuality of exchange motivations has disappeared, since the most
important single element of a viable ongoing contractual relationship commonly is the
mutual desire to make it succeed."); and from within a more orthodox perspective (though
sympathetic to the relational theory) see Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell
Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091
(2000) ("The linkage between efficient breach theory and the misunderstanding of Holmes’s
theory is finding its way into the courts, albeit in fairly innocuous ways thus far. It is likely,
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of "the bad man,"27 the expression in legal theory of the orientation of the
economic rational individual utility maximizer at the heart of Posnerian law
and economics. The locus classicus of this amoral attitude is Judge
Posner’s treatment of efficient breach in his extraordinarily successful
textbook,28 which surely has been the principal medium through which the
concept has been brought to such prominence. In contrast to this, Roberts
sees the greater assurance of a substantial remedy for breach, and therefore
greater assurance of performance, provided by Section 39 as an important
part of the moral compass which restitution can offer to contract, which
expectation-based remedies, derived from Holmes, sadly lack.29
Section 39, she tells us, involves a "significant" "intellectual shift" "in
rationale" for remedies for breach which
will inject moral blameworthiness into contractual legal obligation. It
will honor the view that one’s word is one’s bond . . . . It will send
Holmesian-influenced contract teaching and lawmaking into a new
period of introspection and, perhaps, revision. It will fuel efforts to
dismantle efficient breach theory. It will resonate with moral instincts
of some students, lawyers, and judges. It will deter. It will judge moral
culpability. It will feel like punishment. It will ripple through contract
law and related legal and business sectors.30

however, to have the pernicious effect of encouraging the adoption of the efficient breach
fallacy into the legal arena." (citations omitted)). For the reason set out supra note 11, I have
been unable to make detailed reference to Professor Perillo’s contribution to this
symposium, or other relevant contributions.
27. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
28. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 120 (7th ed. 2007) ("He will
[breach] if the profit would also exceed the expected profit to the other party from
completion of the contract, and hence the damages from breach. So in this case awarding
damages will not deter a breach of contract. It should not. It is an efficient breach.").
Though I will not describe this development here, Judge Posner’s treatment of efficient
breach has grown somewhat more sophisticated over successive editions of his textbook, and
it is no longer, in fact, directly open to the criticisms typically made of it in the way it was in
early editions.
29. See, e.g., Roberts, Moral Compass, supra note 12, at 1018 ("The new
Restatement’s doctrinalization of disgorgement (in the rare moment of opportunistic breach)
may simply right the ship and recalibrate our understanding of what was already happening,
reconcile the results, and incorporate common sense.").
30. Id. at 1026.
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III. What Some English Cases Tell Us Will Be the Problems with
Section 39

As Roberts says in her discussion of the Commonwealth case law and
secondary literature,31 this essentially is the argument that has been made
for the extension of what are now called restitutionary damages in the law
of England and Wales, which reached its high point in Blake. I have
described the process by which these damages have come to be available in
somewhat greater detail than Roberts,32 but much of that detail can be of
little use to the U.S. contract scholar, as opposed to the specialist in equity
or restitution, or, indeed, the legal historian of these doctrines, and for
present purposes there is no point of significant difference between my
account and Roberts’s account of the position established by Blake.
One point of clarification must, however, be made, if only to be put to
one side. We will see that the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords
were very anxious to keep Blake within narrow confines. One of the
confines that was accepted was that Blake should not normally prevent
efficient breach. This is said in so many words by both courts,33 where
desperate efforts were made to insulate the leading British case authorizing
efficient breach, Teacher v. Calder,34 from the effects of Blake. But this
31. See Roberts, Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 12, at 954–65 (detailing
the adoption of disgorgement in Blake for the U.K. and noting its possible adoption in
several other countries).
32. See generally DONALD HARRIS ET AL., REMEDIES IN CONTRACT AND TORT ch. 17
(2d ed. 2001); David Campbell & Donald Harris, In Defence of Breach: A Critique of
Restitution and the Performance Interest, 22 LEGAL STUD. 208 (2002); David Campbell &
Phillip Wylie, Ain’t No Telling (Which Circumstances Are Exceptional), 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
605 (2003).
33. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.) 459 ("[I]t appears to us that the
general rule that damages for breach of contract are compensatory can safely be maintained
without denying the availability of restitutionary damages in exceptional cases."); Attorney
General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.(E.)) 286 (stating situations in which
disgorgement would not be appropriate). The court stated:
[The lower court] suggested three facts which should not be a sufficient ground
for departing from the normal basis on which damages are awarded: the fact that
the breach was cynical and deliberate; the fact that the breach enabled the
defendant to enter into a more profitable contract elsewhere; and the fact that by
entering into a new and more profitable contract the defendant put it out of his
power to perform his contract with the plaintiff. I agree that none of these facts
would be, by itself, a good reason for ordering an account of profits.
Id.
34. See Teacher v. Calder, (1898) 25 R. 661 (finding that the plaintiff was not entitled
to the defendant’s profits, which the defendant had acquired by using the plaintiff’s money
in a distillery business as opposed to a timber business as called for in the contract), aff’d on
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can, as I have said, be put to one side, because this defence of efficient
breach is mere wishful thinking, in fact much more wishful than thoughtful,
for there can be no doubt that the Blake doctrine does work against efficient
breach. I have discussed this elsewhere, and refer the reader to that
discussion,35 and to a, very exceptionally reported, arbitration award by a
highly distinguished panel subsequent to Blake which was intended to ram
the point home.36 Though Roberts should really have dealt with this
attempt to reconcile Blake and efficient breach, which surely is somewhat
awkward for her, I am sure that she captures the logic of the restitutionary
remedy, in respect of this matter, better than have the highest English
courts.37
But where, with respect, Roberts may be thought to be remiss is that
she does not discuss in sufficient detail other English cases after Blake in
which the attempt to turn the wider availability of restitutionary remedies
into workable law has proven very problematic. Roberts perceptively
anticipates the difficulties to which Section 39 will give rise,38 but she does
not deal with the cases in which these difficulties have already become
manifest. The electronic databases tell us that Blake has been cited over
100 times in subsequent cases, and, whilst by no means are all of these on
contract, and whilst not all of those on contract have a bearing on the
general principles of contractual remedies, there are a number, some of
which have reached the Court of Appeal, which demand serious discussion
in this connection.39

this point [1899] A.C. 451, 462, 467 (H.L.(SC.)).
35. See generally David Campbell, The Treatment of Teacher v Calder in AG v Blake,
65 MOD. L. REV. 256 (2002).
36. See AB Corp. v. CD Co. (The Sine Nomine), [2002] 1 LLOYD’S REP. 805, 806
(stating that in an exceptional case a plaintiff may "obtain wrongful profits as damages for
breach of contract," but that on the facts in this case, an efficient breach did not require
disgorgement); see also Campbell & Wylie, supra note 32, at 614–15 (discussing The Sine
Nomine).
37. Roberts generously comments on some of the Commonwealth scholarship that has
dealt more clearly with the implications of restitution for efficient breach. E.g., Roberts,
Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 12, at 968–77.
38. See, e.g., id. at 965 ("[T]he text of the proposed section is clunky and
unappealing. . . . All of this unwieldiness seems calculated to avoid unnecessary association
with the specific performance doctrine and to reassure those who are apprehensive that this
section will be a slippery slope towards the perceived unbounded nature of tort remedies.").
39. The most authoritative review of the English law is HARVEY MCGREGOR,
DAMAGES ch. 12 (18th ed. 2009). The version of this chapter in 17th ed. 2003 is still of
value.
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The point stressed by Kull40 and by Roberts41 is that restitutionary
damages under Section 39 are to have a limited scope. Kull tells us that the
definition of opportunistic breach "will exclude the vast majority of
contractual defaults," and so Section 39 will be an "exceptional . . .
claim."42 Roberts seems rather to regret this at one level, but, of course it is
necessary, as both she and Kull are acutely aware.43 Were restitutionary
damages available as an alternative to expectation-based damages for every
breach, the law of contract would be changed in, to put it at its mildest, an
utterly chaotic manner. This was pointed out by the late Lord Hobhouse in
his formidable dissent in Blake itself.44 The acceptability of restitutionary
damages requires them to be, at the moment, restricted. Subsequent case
law may well enlarge them, as Roberts certainly wants, and as most
academic commentators on the issues in the Commonwealth want. But, at
the moment, in the law of England and Wales, restitutionary damages are
available only in, as it was put in Blake, "exceptional circumstances,"45 and
when I repeatedly have argued that they will not be able to be confined to
these exceptional circumstances, it has been urged against me that the
House of Lords wants them to be.46 I am afraid I do not find this the most
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) ("The first two elements of the definition—requiring that a
breach be both deliberate and profitable—will serve in practice to exclude most contractual
defaults . . . .").
41. E.g., Roberts, Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 12, at 961–67 ("The
inadequacy hurdle, although poorly drafted, is a significant hurdle to a plaintiff’s obtaining
(not seeking) disgorgement relief. In essence, if plaintiff could establish a right to specific
performance by meeting the standard irreparable injury test, then plaintiff should have the
option of seeking disgorgement.").
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. f (2011).
43. See, e.g., Roberts, Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 12, at 963 ("The
requirement that the breach be ‘profitable,’ however, raises a formidable hurdle to
disgorgement relief. In Professor Kull’s estimation, truly profitable breaches are rare.").
44. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.(E.)) 299 ("I must also sound
a further note of warning that if some more extensive principle of awarding noncompensatory damages for breach of contract is to be introduced into our commercial law
the consequences will be very far reaching and disruptive.").
45. Id. at 285.
46. See ANDREW S. BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 486 n.18 (2d ed. 2002)
("Campbell and Harris . . . are highly critical of the reasoning in Blake: but their argument is
directed against restitution for breach of contract as a generally-available remedy, whereas
the House of Lords stressed that it should be an exceptional remedy only."); Ewan
McKendrick, Breach of Contract, Restitution for Wrongs, and Punishment, in COMMERCIAL
REMEDIES 93, 105, 105 n.68 (Andrew S. Burrows & Edwin Peel eds., 2003) ("[Accounting
for profits for breach of contract] is a remedy of last resort and not, as some commentators
appear to think, a remedy of primary resort." (citing Campbell & Harris, supra note 32)).
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convincing reply, for the point is not what the House of Lords wants; the
point is what it will get. And the cases so far show no ability whatsoever to
draw a justiciable line between ordinary and exceptional circumstances.
It is, I think, clear that "deliberate" is not really the correct word to
describe what is being aimed at in Section 39. As I will argue,47
deliberation itself is neither here nor there, and it is only when one has the
background belief that to breach a contract is a wrong in a more than
technical sense that deliberate breach carries some pejorative implication in
itself. In the United States, describing a breach as "wilfull" perhaps most
effectively conveys the sense being sought, though "wilfull" thereby runs
the risk of being a mere tautology for "opportunistic," to the extent that one
can say that there can be a tautology composed of two terms both of which
have proven radically difficult to define clearly. The most influential
English equivalent to "wilfull" is that a breach is "deliberate and cynical,"48
which obviously adds some conception of "the defendant’s moral
culpability"49 to the notion of mere deliberation, perhaps better capturing
the idea that there is something aggravating about "the moral calibre of the
defendant’s conduct"50 which makes it morally inferior to the conduct of the
"innocent" plaintiff.
But a breach being deliberate and cynical was never thought enough in
itself even by the Court of Appeal in Blake, inter alia because "the line
cannot easily be drawn in practise,"51 and to it was added the grounds of
"skimped performance"52 and "doing the very thing which [the defendant]
contracted not to do."53 I have criticized these very flimsy grounds
elsewhere,54 but the point need not be pressed because they actually were
abandoned in Blake itself, somewhere between the Court of Appeal’s and
47. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing what is meant by
"deliberate").
48. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.) 457.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 456.
51. Id. at 457.
52. Id. at 458.
53. Id.
54. See Campbell & Harris, supra note 32, at 228–30 (arguing that skimped
performance and doing that which was contracted not to do, are inadequate bases for the
accounting of profits remedy because absolute performance or liquidated damages can be
negotiated for ex ante, and thereby priced into the contract). The Court of Appeal based the
skimped performance ground on the famous case of City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s
Charitable Assoc., 9 So. 486 (La. 1891). See also discussion infra Part VIII (discussing why
disgorgement cases arise and how to deal with them).
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the House of Lords’s hearing of the case.55 However, to say they were
abandoned is misleading. Any attempt to state them as defensibly coherent
legal concepts was abandoned, but the vague sentiment behind them was
retained, and indeed has guided the case law after Blake. But not only is it
impossible to see precisely what was meant by "deliberate" or "cynical" or
some combination thereof in Blake itself, the attempt to sustain any such
idea after Blake laughably collapsed when the Court of Appeal, in the most
important decision since Blake, ended up protecting rights that a plaintiff
himself had acquired by a breach which took the form of prolonged
deceit!56
The relationship between restitutionary damages and punitive, or
exemplary in the English terminology, damages, which is bound to be
difficult as both purport to be "exceptional," but in different ways, has been,
mirabile dictu, made even more tangled by a Court of Appeal which was
prepared in one case to sacrifice "logic" to "practical justice" in its haste to
use restitutionary damages effectively to punish an admittedly odious
defendant.57
In all her papers, Roberts acknowledges that the principles of the
quantification of restitutionary damages remain to be properly worked out,
but in that part of the law of England and Wales where liability to disgorge
has taken the most firm hold, breach of negative covenant in conveyances
55. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.(E.)) 268, 277, 291 ("[T]he
Solicitor General . . . argued for a recognition of an action for disgorgement of profits
against a contract breaker where four conditions are fulfilled."). Lord Steyn continued:
(1) There has been a breach of a negative stipulation. (2) The contract breaker
has obtained the profit by doing the very thing which he promised not to do.
(3) The innocent party (in this case the Crown as represented by the Attorney
General) has a special interest over and above the hope of a benefit to be
assessed in monetary terms. (4) Specific performance or an injunction is an
ineffective or virtually ineffective remedy for the breach. The Solicitor General
persuaded me that in the case of Blake each of these conditions is satisfied. But
since I recognise that it would be wrong to create a remedy simply to cover this
case, it is right that I should explain the specific considerations which lead me to
conclude that it is right on a principled basis to develop the law in a way which
covers this case and other cases sharing materially similar features.
Id. at 291.
56. See Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 323
(finding that although the defendant had used recordings of Jimi Hendrix in violation of a
prior settlement, "the case was not exceptional to the point that the court should award an
account of profits"); Campbell & Wylie, supra note 32 (discussing Experience Hendrix).
57. Borders (U.K.) Ltd. & Others v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis & Another,
[2005] EWCA (Civ) 197 at [28]; see also David Campbell & James Devenney, Damages at
the Borders of Legal Reasoning, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 208 (2006) (discussing Borders).
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of land, not only is liability a dreadful mess, but the principles of
quantification are nothing more than guesswork. The best that we have
been told is that the hypothetical deal "has to feel right"58 to the Court, and
this standard (if this is the right word) is supposed to be justified because
these are "matters of judgment which are incapable of strict rational and
logical exposition from beginning to end."59
Finally, the feared clash between valued contract principles and the
new restitutionary damages has occurred in a case in which there can be no
doubt that the agreement of the parties was effectively rewritten in order to
lead to an award of restitutionary damages,60 something for which there is
important "authority" in the canon of the Birksian argument.61
One could go on,62 but this is enough and more than enough. I have
discussed all the cases I have just mentioned in other work and could only
58. Amec Dev. Ltd. v. Jury’s Hotel Mgmt. (U.K.) Ltd., [2001] 1 E.G.L.R. 81, 87; see
also David Campbell, The Extinguishing of Contract, 67 MOD. L. REV. 818, 821–23 (2004)
(discussing Amec).
59. Amec, [2001] 1 E.G.L.R. at 87.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 198–201 (discussing Lane v. O’Brien Homes,
[2004] EWHC 303 (QB)).
61. See discussion infra Part VIII (discussing Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside
Homes Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch.D.)).
62. The two cases I have not mentioned which seem to have the greatest possibility of
effecting commercial relationships are Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. NIAD, [2001] EWHC 6
(Ch.) and WWF—World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund) v. World
Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 286, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 445. The former
arguably is the most expansive interpretation of the Birksian argument in the case law. The
latter seems to be a determined attempt to halt the Birksian argument in its tracks which,
should it be followed, will be a most important case. However, both of these cases are, in
their different ways, particularly difficult and confused, and they so far have not had much
influence on the subsequent law, nor, indeed, have been adequately discussed in the
secondary literature. McGregor’s discussion of WWF, supra note 39, at § 12-030, exploits
the case’s undeniably unnecessary and unfortunate complication to place a substantial
question mark over the extent of the influence it will prove to have.
Though when they wrote there had been no cases directly on it, and after some earlier
indications of the argument by leading figures of the Birksian argument had not been
developed, the relationship between the equitable remedies and restitutionary damages has
been explored in connection with the protection of business confidences, an area where the
plaintiff’s remedy typically has been an interim or final injunction. See Ter Kah Leng &
Susannah H.S. Leong, Contractual Protection of Business Confidence, 2002 J. BUS. L. 513.
I have argued that making restitutionary damages more widely available to effectively
supplement the plaintiff’s armoury in this area is quite indefensible. See David Campbell,
Hamlet Without the Prince: How Leng and Leong Use Restitution to Extinguish Equity,
2003 J. BUS. L. 131. A recent case would appear (its immense length and unnecessary
complication makes it difficult to determine its ratio) to have advocated what is essentially
Leng and Leong’s position. Vercoe v. Rutland Fund Mgmt. Ltd., [2010] EWHC 424 (Ch) at
[339–45].
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repeat what I have said were I to discuss them here. I refer the U.S.
audience to these cases and to my discussion of them, in which, I fear, that
audience may see the United States’ future foretold.63 What I want to do
here is to stress that the decided English cases since Blake show that the
aim of putting Section 39 disgorgement on a sound, because circumscribed,
footing is bound to encounter very serious difficulty, and to turn to the
reasons why this is so. It is not the English courts’ failings that has led to
these problems, though there have been failings enough. It is that
disgorgement of the type envisaged in Section 39 cannot be put on a sound
footing, because the enterprise is wholly ill-conceived.
The related problems are three. First, R3RUE tells us that a major
virtue of using restitution to attack opportunistic breach by means of
disgorgement is that it will bring theoretical coherence by "stating a rule to
generalize . . . commonly accepted outcomes";64 but it cannot do so because
a coherent doctrine of disgorgement cannot be founded on restitution.
Second, the attack on opportunistic breach is to serve as the basis for the
attack on the immoral or amoral attitude of Holmes’s bad man in the way
we have seen; but it cannot do so because, far from being immoral, the bad
man’s attitude is expressive of cooperation in contract of a type which the
relational theory of contract should find particularly desirable. Third,
implicit in this is a horrid truth that completely undermines the idea of
regarding breach as a wrong. Breach of contract is not a wrong in any other
63. Professor Saiman has interestingly argued that the prospects for the reception of
R3RUE generally are bleak because the abstract, doctrinal nature of the Birksian argument is
at odds with the legal realist tradition of U.S. adjudication in the area Birks would call
obligations. See Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common
Law Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487 (2007); Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America:
Why the U.S. Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99
(2008). In my opinion, Saiman gives far too much credence to the theoretical coherence of
Birks’s work, and he would have done well to give more weight to Professor Hedley’s
devastating criticisms of that work. See generally, e.g., STEVE HEDLEY, RESTITUTION: ITS
DIVISION AND ORDERING (2001); Steve Hedley, The Taxonomic Approach to Restitution, in
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, OBLIGATIONS AND RESTITUTION 151, 151–63
(Alistair Hudson ed., 2004). But, whatever the merits of Saiman’s views of the nature of
Birks’s theory, it is far more important that his argument surely is undermined by the
decided modern restitution cases, in relationship to contract but even more so elsewhere,
which make Birks’s claim to be pursuing the elimination of "discretionary remedialism,"
see Peter Birks, Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism, 29 U.W. AUSTL. L.
REV. 1 (2000), a joke at its own expense. See David Campbell, Classification and the Crisis
of the Common Law, 26 J.L. & SOC’Y 369 (1999) (book review). On the relationship of
Birksian taxonomy and legal realism from a position sympathetic to Birks, see Hanoch
Dagan, Legal Realism and the Taxonomy of Private Law, in STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION
IN PRIVATE LAW ch. 8 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Ross Grantham eds., 2008).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. a (2011).
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than a technical way. Rather, it is an essential legal institution
indispensable to the efficient functioning of market economies. To the
extent that restitutionary damages are set against the wrong of breach, they
will not be chosen by parties who value that institution and who contract on
the basis of the Holmesian choice. Such damages cannot be made of wide
application whilst there is freedom of contract, for parties with freedom of
choice would normally oust the restitutionary position if it was made the
default basis of remedies.
IV. Restitution Cannot Ground Disgorgement
In the architecture of R3RUE as set out in its overall table of contents,
breach of contract is not included in Chapter 5 on "restitution for wrongs,"
which is confined to two categories, "benefits acquired by tort or other
breach of duty" and "diversion of property rights at death."65 But this
exclusion, as R3RUE makes clear, is merely a consequence of a decision to
keep the relevant sections on contract within one chapter,66 and Section 39,
which addresses "an instance of restitution for benefits wrongfully
obtained . . . is identical in principle to the claims described in Chapter 5,"67
turns on the belief that the breaches it addresses are "a wrong." It was
essential that R3RUE follow one of Birks’s fundamental conceptual
arguments in regarding breach as a wrong, for it is only by doing so that an
innovation such as Section 39 is made possible. I will set out the argument
derived from Birks briefly, and then show it to be a wholly suspect
argument in relation to contract and, as such, the source of the problems we
have discussed.
It is, of course, uncontroversial that restitutionary recovery may be
obtained when a valuable benefit is conveyed to a party who subsequently
breaches and who therefore would be unjustly enriched if he retained the
benefit.68 These "quasi-contractual" cases are divided in the law of England
65. Id. ch. 5 topic 1; id. ch. 5, topic 2.
66. See id. § 39 cmt. a ("The rule of this Section has been placed in Chapter 4 rather
than Chapter 5 in order to group together, for clarity of exposition, the divergent and
contrasting themes of restitution in a contractual context.").
67. Id.
68. See, however, Kull’s interesting remarks on quasi-contract in Andrew Kull,
Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1485–90 (1994)
(critiquing quasi-contract and restitution). I myself believe that the law is uncontroversial
only in the sense that it is currently settled, for I am of the opinion that the law of contractual
remedies in general would be much improved by the abolition of the quasi-contractual
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and Wales into those in which the valuable benefit is a payment of money,
such as a payment in advance for goods not delivered, for which the remedy
is an action for monies had and received, and those in which the benefit is a
performance other than a payment of money, such as construction work for
which payment is not made, for which the remedy is a quantum meruit.
This distinction is treated as a mere practical difference of quantification in
the U.S. law of contract,69 and, indeed, both actions do rest on a common
jurisprudential basis. Both are cases of what Birks called "restitution of
subtraction," because the valuable benefit is subtracted from the plaintiff, to
which must be contrasted "restitution for wrongs,"70 which will be set out
shortly.71 For the moment, we must note that it is very important to realize
that the paradigm case of opportunistic breach, the efficient breach, is not a
case of subtraction.
Many criticisms of the concept of efficient breach are not, in fact,
direct criticisms of that concept at all. They are criticisms of a breach that
leaves the plaintiff inadequately compensated because of the practicalities
of obtaining an adequate remedy.
This is the specific problem
72
contemplated in R3RUE.
This can be pursued, as it is pursued by
remedies and am preparing a statement of this argument.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. a (1981) ("If the benefit
consists simply of a sum of money received by the party from whom restitution is sought,
there is no difficulty in determining this amount. If the benefit consists of . . . services or
property, its measurement in terms of money may pose serious problems.").
70. BIRKS, supra note 3, at 22–25. It is possible to trace the thinking back to Birks’s
noted 1982 Current Legal Problems lecture. Peter Birks, Restitution and Wrongs, 35
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 53 (1982). The concept of subtraction has, of course, been
identified in the U.S. scholarly literature. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
Vol. III p. 329 (4th ed. 2004) ("Restitution as a remedy for breach of contract is limited to
benefits that are regarded as having somehow flowed from the injured party, a party that can
be said to have ‘lost’ something that the party in breach is being asked to ‘restore.’"); see
also E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1370–82 (1985).
Though he ultimately identifies "unjust enrichment" as what is really at issue, it is not,
in fact, possible to trace the development of the crucial distinction between "restitution of
subtraction" and "restitution for wrongs" through Kull’s own work, for, on the basis of his
understanding of restitution of subtraction as "restoration," see Andrew Kull, Rationalising
Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1212–15, 1219–22 (1995); see Kull, supra note 16, at
2031–38, he takes the novel line of trying to develop a general law of rescission. See Kull,
supra note 68, at 1491–99; Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569
(2006). I believe this is highly interesting, and, for what it is worth, in my opinion it is the
way the law should be developed in this area. But it does not map on to the law of
restitution, in the Birksian argument or in general, at all easily.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 76–77 (discussing restitution for wrongs).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h (2011)
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Roberts,73 into the way the mitigation rules so reduce the defendant’s
liability that the rewards of successful suit are too small to justify to the
plaintiff the expense and risk of (the threat of) litigation. As Stewart
Macaulay put it in an important paper:
Limit[ing] remedies allows stronger parties to walk away from
burdensome obligations at low or no cost. Courts frequently find that a
stronger [party] has breached a contract, but so limit the remedy
awarded the weaker that the victory is hollow.74

These are powerful criticisms of the operation of the law of remedies
which must be taken onboard. Much of what we can hope usefully to say
about particularly consumer law must turn on them. But they are criticisms
of the shortcomings of civil procedure and of the operation (and design) of
contract rules in the light of those shortcomings. They are not criticisms of
the concept of efficient breach.75 Analytically, in efficient breach, the
("In a market context, gain to one party is normally offset or exceeded by loss to the other;
while the test of efficiency will not be met unless the injured party is fully indemnified
against the cost of resolving the resulting dispute.").
73. See Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 12, at 171–75 ("[T]he
primary thrust behind the mitigation principle is don’t be lazy—instead avoid unnecessary
consequences. It asks the nonbreaching party to participate and avoid consequences by
stopping or by acting. Mitigation’s focus on the nonbreacher runs counter to disgorgement
principles.").
74. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 470;
see also id. at 469–70 (citing the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, "[Courts] limit the remedy to
the difference in value between the contract as performed and as it should have been had
there been no breach. While this sounds reasonable, the burden of proof usually confines
diminution in value to a token remedy" (citations omitted)); Ian R. Macneil, Essays on the
Nature of Contract, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 159, 183–84 (1980) (discussing several issues with
procuring full recovery including: limited recoveries due to foreseeability or certainty,
litigation costs, risks inherent in litigation and the difficulty of enforcing judgments); Ian R.
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 947–60
(1982) (discussing the effect of transaction costs on breach). See generally Ian R. Macneil,
Contract Remedies: A Need for a Better Efficiency Analysis, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 6 (1988).
75. From his earlier work, it is not clear whether Kull ever allows of efficient breach
proper, for he seems to identify efficient breach with "a conscious decision to give the
plaintiff less than what was promised." Kull, supra note 16, at 2051. It certainly is the case
that his position is far stronger when the breach is not, in fact, efficient.
In what seems to be the most influential criticism of efficient breach from a
conventional perspective, Professor Friedmann tells us that Posner’s treatment of efficient
breach rests on "the implied assumption [that it] entails no transaction costs. This is,
however, totally unrealistic." Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 6–7 (1989). I do not think this entirely fair to Posner, certainly not to his later
statements of efficient breach, see supra note 28, but, however this is, it does not tell against
the concept of efficient breach. The same point could be made against all breaches, or, to
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plaintiff is adequately compensated. It is efficient only because of this. As
this is so, then, again analytically, there is no subtraction in efficient breach
cases, because the plaintiff is compensated. There can be no restitution in
efficient breach cases on the same ground that it is settled that there may be
restitution in quasi-contractual cases.
In light of this, the necessity of "restitution for wrongs" for the
development of a law of restitution of wider application to contract
situations becomes clear.76 Restitution of subtraction is but an indirect and
poor way of driving at unjust enrichment, and enrichment "by doing wrong
to"77 is a much closer approximation to the real target. Though Birks did
not, to my knowledge, directly address the principal law and economics
literature on efficient breach, which I have no doubt he would have
regarded as completely misdirected, the concept of restitution for wrongs is
intended, inter alia, to embrace the situation described as efficient breach,
and it readily can do so. If breach is objected to as a wrong, from which the
defendant should not be allowed to profit, then restitution for wrongs, as an
apparently more direct attack on such profit, can do more to discourage or
prevent breach than expectation-based remedies, which are directed at the
compensation of the defendant, and so only indirectly, if at all, at the
defendant’s profit. The drive behind both of the leading English cases,
Wrotham Park and Blake, and most of the intervening cases, was that the
plaintiff would have received only nominal damages in these cases if
confined to an expectation-based measure. Grounding restitution in the
plaintiff’s profits—in part in Wrotham Park, and in full in Blake—was a
put the argument the other way around, any "transaction costs" of an efficient breach can be
compensated as incidental damages to just the extent as they would be in regard of other
breaches, and, more than this, the concept of efficient breach absolutely requires that they
will be compensated in this way. There can be no doubt Friedmann wants to attack the very
concept of efficient breach: "[S]uch a taking of an entitlement, for the sake of private gain,
runs counter to the very basis of private law." Id. at 23. But his principal arguments are not
directed at, or at least do not hit, the concept.
76. BIRKS, supra note 3, at 313–57. The basic theoretical development of this
category was more couched in terms of tort, and, indeed, it might be said that an effect of
treating breach of contract as a wrong is to assimilate it with tort, a point which pervades the
Birksian argument), id. at 44, 334 ("Restitution for breach of contract is part of restitution for
wrongs."); see also Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 29, 33 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) ("[A] failure to perform a
contract or to fulfil an obligation to make restitution of unjust enrichment . . . is no less
capable of being described as a breach of duty than negligent injury or defamation or any
other familiar tort."), and is surely strongly implied by the architecture of R3RUE. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting the structure of R3RUE as it relates to
Section 39).
77. BIRKS, supra note 3, at 23–24.
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shift to what we might, allowing a certain rewriting of the actual pleadings
to get at the concepts, call treating breach as a wrong.
This shift is the point of Wrotham Park and Blake, which involved
breaches which might be described as "opportunistic" in that they were
deliberate; they were profitable in that there were "gains to the defendant
(net of potential liability in damages) greater than the defendant would have
realized from performance of the contract";78 and they resulted in
inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement because,
compensatory damages being nominal, a promissee’s right to recover
damages for a breach affords inadequate protection.79 In Wrotham Park,
the plaintiff’s predecessor in title conveyed part of an estate to the
defendant’s predecessor in title.80 The conveyance contained a restrictive
covenant by which development of the land had to conform with a lay-out
plan approved by the vendor or his successor in title.81 The defendant, a
developer, breached the covenant by building fourteen houses in excess of
the plan.82 It was found that "[n]o damage of a financial nature has been
done to the plaintiff by the breach of the lay-out stipulation [and t]he
plaintiff’s use of the Wrotham Park Estate has not and will not be
impeded."83 This would, of course, have meant that the plaintiff’s damages
quantified on the normal diminution in value measure would be nominal.84
As the court was reluctant to grant a mandatory injunction which would
have meant the houses had to be demolished, the award of nominal
damages effectively would have been a costless permission to the defendant
to breach.85 This was a situation in which the court felt that "justice
[would] manifestly not have been done,"86 and so it gave the plaintiff
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011).
79. Id. § 39(2)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
80. Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch.D.)
799.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 804.
83. Id. at 811.
84. See id. at 812 ("[T]he damages [would be] nil or purely nominal, because the value
of the Wrotham Park Estate as the plaintiffs concede is not diminished by one farthing in
consequence of the construction of a road and the erection of 14 houses on the allotment
site.").
85. See id. ("If, for social and economic reasons, the court does not see fit in the
exercise of its discretion, to order demolition of the 14 houses, is it just that the plaintiffs
should receive no compensation . . . ? Common sense would seem to demand a negative
answer to this question.").
86. Id. at 815.
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damages representing the price the defendant would have had to pay to
obtain a release from the covenant, which the court estimated at 5% of the
profit the defendant made from the breach.87
Wrotham Park was not decided as a restitution case. The court
believed itself to be exercising a power to award damages which is based in
nineteenth century equity jurisprudence, and the first theoretical
rationalization made of the award in modern terms was of it as
"hypothetical release" or "lost opportunity to bargain" damages,88 which are
a form of compensatory damages, albeit quite different from (and
contradictory of) compensatory damages as we normally understand them.
But, following considerable turmoil in a succession of cases,89 in Blake, the
House of Lords identified Wrotham Park as one of the "appropriate
situations" in which a "restitutionary claim for the profits made from a
breach of contract" should be recognized.90 The Lords saw the importance
of Wrotham Park to be that it offered the possibility of correcting a
situation in which contracts "may be breached with impunity," which would
be "a sorry reflection on the law."91 As the plaintiff got only part of the
defendant’s profits, Wrotham Park was a case of what has since been called
"partial" restitution or disgorgement. Blake itself was a "total" restitution or
disgorgement case.
In Blake, the restitutionary remedy was used to attempt to prevent a
profit arising from conduct which was an egregious moral wrong. Between
1944 and 1960, George Blake was employed by the British security
services.92 As a condition of his employment he signed a declaration of
compliance with the Official Secrets Act,93 and in the proceedings in Blake
this was held to be a simple contractual undertaking not to divulge official
87. Id. at 816. There is some obscurity about the measure of profit, though much less
than in most other cases, and it does not affect the argument.
88. Robert J. Sharpe & S.M. Waddams, Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain, 2
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 290 (1982); infra note 191 and accompanying text.
89. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, ch. 17 (discussing the leading cases); Campbell
& Harris, supra note 32 (same). The leading cases are Bracewell v. Appleby, [1975] Ch.
408, Surrey C.C. v. Bredero Homes Ltd., [1992] 3 All ER 303 (Ch.D.), [1993] 1 W.L.R.
1361 (C.A.), and Jaggard v. Sawyer, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 269.
90. Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.(E.)) 282–83.
91. Id. at 283.
92. Id. at 275.
93. See Official Secrets Act, 1989, c. 6, § 1 (Eng.) ("[A] person . . . is guilty of an
offence if without lawful authority he discloses any information, document or other article
relating to security or intelligence which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his
position as a member of any of those services . . . .").
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information.94 In 1961, Blake was imprisoned in England for espionage.95
However, in 1966 he escaped from custody, and he has since lived in the
foreign country for which he was a spy.96 In 1989 he agreed with a U.K.
publisher to publish an autobiography for which he was to receive an
advance of £150,000.97 As in Wrotham Park, compensatory damages for
this breach would have been nominal, but the then Attorney General, no
doubt mindful of a predecessor’s previous humiliating failure to prevent
publication of Peter Wright’s Spycatcher disclosures about the secret
services,98 largely because foreign publication made granting a domestic
injunction ridiculous,99 wisely did not seek an injunction to prevent
publication, but he did seek to prevent Blake from receiving the £90,000
that remained to be paid of his advance (£60,000 had been paid and
obviously was practically irrecoverable).100 The manifest unsavouriness of
allowing conduct like Blake’s eventually to yield a benefit to him101 led
their Lordships102 to generalize a restitutionary remedy which would
completely cover Blake’s breach of his simple contractual undertaking not
to divulge official information by enforcing recovery of his advance from
his publisher.
The total restitution or disgorgement in Blake has been run together
with partial restitution or disgorgement in Wrotham Park to create what has
since been called a "sliding scale" of restitutionary or disgorgement
damages. The sliding scale certainly was implicit particularly in Lord
Nicholl’s leading speech in Blake,103 and has been made explicit in an
account of his extra-judicial views:
94. See discussion infra Part X.
95. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. at 268.
96. See id. ("In 1966 Blake escaped from Wormwood Scrubs prison and fled to Berlin
and then to Moscow. He is still there, a fugitive from justice.").
97. Id.
98. See generally Attorney Gen. v. Observer Ltd., [1990] 1 A.C. 109.
99. See MALCOLM TURNBULL, THE SPYCATCHER TRIAL 299 (1989) ("[The Judge] held
that henceforth, given the wide circulation of Spycatcher throughout the rest of the world,
newspapers were free to report its contents in the United Kingdom.").
100. Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.(E.)) 275.
101. See infra notes 240–46 and accompanying text (discussing the atmosphere
surrounding the Blake case).
102. Following a strategy advocated by Birks: Peter Birks, Restitutionary Damages for
Breach of Contract: Snepp and the Fusion of Law and Equity, 1987 LLOYD’S MARITIME &
COM. L.Q. 421.
103. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 261–62 ("In Blake, Lord Nicholls explicitly
stated that, to the extent Wrotham Park and Bredero Homes are inconsistent, the former is to
be preferred.").
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Once one had crossed the threshold for being able to recover an account
of profits for breach of contract, rather than compensatory damages or
specific relief, Lord Nicholls thought that the measure of recovery could
extend from expense saved through to stripping a proportion of the
profits made through to stripping all the profits made from the breach.
The Wrotham Park Estate case (where 5 per cent of the profits had been
stripped) was therefore based on the same principles as A.-G. v Blake
(where all the profits had been stripped).104

There are immense and, in my opinion, irresolvable problems with the
entire argument for a unified category of restitutionary damages which have
given rise to the unsatisfactory English cases mentioned above.105 I wish to
focus here on the fundamental problem, which generates the others. This is
that, in seemingly completing itself in Blake, the Birksian argument for the
wider availability of restitution for breach of contract actually annihilated
itself.106 Obviously, restitution of subtraction can be subsumed under
restitution for wrongs, for the breach that yields an unjust enrichment is a
wrong whether or not there is subtraction. What is more, the point can be
turned around, for if wrongful breach is abhorrent in cases of subtraction, it
also is abhorrent in cases without subtraction, for the wrong of breach is
present in both. This is precisely why restitution for wrongs seemed to be
necessary to deal with Wrotham Park and Blake situations in which
compensatory damages would have been nominal, for there was no loss to
compensate, and therefore no subtraction. Especially after it had been
subjected to such devastating exposure of its rococo over-elaboration as that
mounted by Hedley,107 one can forget that Birks’s basic idea was very
simple. It was to make "restitution" embrace not merely "giving back," but
also "giving up."108 Birks used to insist that the underlying Latin
"restituere/restitution" could embrace both of these situations,109 which map
on to restitution of subtraction and restitution for wrongdoing. The former
104. Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel, Breach of Contract, Restitution for Wrongs, and
Punishment: Review of Discussion, in COMMERCIAL REMEDIES, supra note 46, at 129.
105. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the English cases).
106. Birks’s criticisms of the incoherence of quasi-contract, BIRKS, supra note 3, at 29–
39 ("[T]he whole law of quasi-contract belongs inside the law of restitution."), largely
survive the failure of his proposed alternative.
107. See Hedley, Taxonomic, supra note 63, at 162 ("[T]he supposedly solid roots of
restitutionary theory are in fact distinctly shaky. What is presented as clear in principle
actually rests on no more than repeated assertion.").
108. Peter Birks, Equity and the Modern Law, 26 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 28 n.57
(1996).
109. Id.
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certainly was grounded in authority, and the latter was intended to be able
to borrow on this quality to sanction its attempt to extend restitution to
cover giving up situations.
But the very idea of restitution in the concept of restitution for
wrongdoing is extremely problematic. As there is no subtraction, there is
no valuable benefit conveyed, and therefore there is nothing to be restored.
The edifice collapses. There can be no restitution of wrongs as a category
potentially covering all breaches, for cases other than cases of subtraction,
the very cases that were to be handled better as a result of the innovation,
cannot be restitution cases. All this seemed to dawn on Birks as the cases
decided purportedly in line with his thinking threw up serious problems
with restitution itself, and he was engaged on two fresh starts bringing
"unjust enrichment" rather than "restitution" to the fore at the time of his
death.110 I would advise the U.S. audience concerned with the relationship
of restitution and contract simply to ignore these. (Of course, that audience
is at perfect liberty to disregard my advice.)111 In my opinion, which
authoritative figures do not share, they both are markedly poor, especially
by comparison to the brilliance of An Introduction to the Law of
Restitution,112 and add only confusion to the study of that relationship.113
The broad thrust of Birks’s later work is to adopt a "multi-causal"
approach which, I will merely assert here in respect of Birks himself, gives
up the attractive unifying thrust of his early work. Not all of Birks’s
reasons for wanting to abandon restitution and speak of unjust enrichment,
framed across the whole of the law of obligations, are relevant to us. But
110. See PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 4 (2d ed. 2005) ("The law of gain-based
recovery is larger than the law of unjust enrichment. Every unjust enrichment gives rise to a
right to restitution, but that proposition cannot be turned round . . . . Restitution is not monocasual."); Peter Birks, Misnomer, in RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE ch. 1 (W.
Cornish et al. eds., 1998) ("[W]e ought to call our subject unjust enrichment."). Despite
talking in the most radical tones of the need to break with his earlier work, I think Birks
sometimes inconsistently maintained his aim to "extend" the meaning of restitution in his
later work. E.g., Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, supra note 4, at 1773,
1781 ("[T]he law of restitution was to be the law of rights to a giving up: a person with a
restitutionary right was a person with a right that another give up something, no matter
whether the giving up was or was not a giving back.").
111. The U.S. readership of this Article may most conveniently begin to make its mind
up by looking at Birks, A Letter to America: The New Restatement of Restitution, supra note
4.
112. BIRKS, supra note 3.
113. It seems significant that Birks got into such a quandary over what he was doing
that he did not even really settle on unjust enrichment, but at one point was prepared to use a
terminology of "disgorgement" if that terminology could be "universally adopted": Birks,
Misonmer, supra note 110, at 12–13.
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with respect to breach of contract, this shift seems pointless, for an
enrichment "rule" does not allow us "to generalize . . . commonly accepted
outcomes"114 any more than did a restitution "rule." If breach is wrongful,
why should the empirical incident that the defendant is enriched by it
matter? Let us imagine that a defendant breaches in order to make a profit
by moving to a new contract, but fails to do so because of unforeseen
problems with the new contract. Is it defensible that he should make no
"restitution" of his "unjust enrichment?" Can a distinction be drawn
between such a case and an otherwise identical breach from the point of
view of the plaintiff in which the defendant is enriched because he does
make the expected profit?
The main response to all this in the Commonwealth literature115 has
been to, in effect, go back to the distinction between restitution of
subtraction and restitution for wrongs, which reappear as, in the terms of
Dr. James Edelman (as he then was),116 "restitution" and "disgorgement."
Edelman’s version of the "multi-causal" argument, benefitting from early
endorsement by Birks,117 has attracted the most discussion, including by
Roberts,118 who regards it highly. It is, I think, instructive to say something
about Edelman’s views,119 for they show where the U.S. argument must, I
think, go, and where, indeed, Roberts has already gone.
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. a (2011).
115. I ignore the development of the philosophy of "restitution" and "unjust
enrichment" which, despite recent distinguished contributions by e.g. Professor Dagan, still
is principally associated with Professor Weinrib. In briefest compass, the point I am trying
to make here would cut against Weinrib’s basic argument that "the principle of unjust
enrichment [is] an embodiment of corrective justice," see Ernest Weinrib, The Normative
Structure of Unjust Enrichment, in STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW, supra
note 63, at 43, because corrective justice means two quite different things in subtraction and
nonsubtraction contract cases, or, to put the point more strongly in the way I would prefer,
there is no injustice to correct in nonsubtraction contract cases. The point is impossible to
make at reasonable length in the context of a criticism of the Birksian argument because
Weinrib has always had a far more sophisticated view of breach of contract than Birks.
116. Edleman has recently been appointed to the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
117. See Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, supra note 4, at 1773–74
("Edelman calls the former a restitutionary award for the wrong, the latter a disgorgement
award or, more straightforwardly, ‘restitutionary damages’ and ‘disgorgement damages.’
His work . . . argues strongly for the legitimacy of gain-based awards, and it succeeds in
showing that there are two quite different measures." (citations omitted)).
118. See generally Roberts, Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 12, at 954–61.
119. I will not, however, go into the case law in which Edelman’s argument has been
discussed, which would not, in my opinion, justify the length of treatment necessary to
explain much of this typically not very penetrating judicial dicta to a U.S. audience: e.g.
WWF—World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund) v. World Wrestling
Fed’n Entm’t Inc., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 286, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 445.
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For Edelman, "restitution" and "disgorgement" are two forms of "gainbased damages."120 As I have argued elsewhere,121 this is in itself
unobjectionable, but only because it is wholly reactionary.122 Having two
forms of damages avoids the problems of Birks’s attempt to unify the field
in terms of restitution, but only by returning to the position prior to the
attempt, as Edelman’s category of gain-based damages has no theoretical
integrity in itself. In Edelman, restitution is confined to its acknowledged
bounds prior to Birks, to giving back in situations of subtraction, and
disgorgement is confined to giving up in other situations, which were also
recognized prior to Birks. In a number of situations broadly related to
contract, disgorgement has, of course, long been available. In Blake, a
"light sprinkling of cases where courts have made orders having the same
effect as an order for an account of profits"123 are used as the springboard
authority for Blake’s extension of the restitutionary or disgorgement
remedy to breaches of simple contract. The clearest one is breach of the
many fiduciary duties, which Edelman stresses. We are on relatively solid
ground here, and, speaking generally, one can say that good arguments have
been made for disgorgement in some specific circumstances. But why is
gain-based damages identifiable as a theoretical category, other than by its
merely empirical effect? Edelman subsumes restitution and disgorgement
under the rubric of gain-based damages,124 but, with respect, this is
perfectly straightforward. What is not straightforward, and what Edelman
does not do, is theoretically unify them. What was restitution or unjust
enrichment in Birks is now gain-based damages in Edelman, but, though
the name changes, the problem remains the same. Or, indeed, the problem
gets worse, as one can concede the abstract attractiveness of Birks’s attempt
to bring taxonomical neatness to the law of obligations, but Edelman’s
taxonomy begins by giving this up, and there is nothing put in its place.
Edelman’s general reason for awarding gain-based damages is that the
plaintiff has a "legitimate reason" for seeking them,125 but this reason,
derived from Blake and the more or less settled case law prior to it, is a
120. JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES 65 (2002). For a recent statement by
Edelman of the multi-causal approach, see generally James Edelman, The Measure of
Restitution and the Future of Restitutionary Damages, 18 RESTITUTION L. REV. 1 (2010).
121. See Campbell, supra note 13 (noting that the combination of restitution and
disgorgement is unobjectionable).
122. See generally EDELMAN, supra note 120, at 36–41.
123. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.(E.)) 284.
124. Supra note 120 and accompanying text.
125. EDELMAN, supra note 120, at 189.
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truism (as it was in Blake and the previous law) which adds nothing to the
discussion, and the concrete reasons Edelman gives for awarding restitution
or disgorgement are very much the ones (including the legitimate reason)
for which they would have been awarded in the law prior to Wrotham Park
and Blake. But, leaving restitution in Edelman’s sense aside because this
unarguably covers subtraction cases, Edelman wants disgorgement to be
extended to breach of simple contract just as much as Birks, and to the
fiduciary duty and other existing occasions for disgorgement, he adds a new
one of general scope: in essence, cynical breach when compensatory
damages will leave the defendant with a profit. But, as I have said,126 that
this is quite untenable began to emerge somewhere between the Court of
Appeal’s and the House of Lords’s judgments in Blake itself, and this has
been emphasised in the subsequent cases.
Once one sees this, one has to ask why we should allow the extension
of disgorgement sought by Edelman, and recognize there is no good
answer. Edelmann confesses that "it is very difficult to tell when the law
will consider that a plaintiff has a legitimate interest,"127 and he cannot do
better than this by looking to a unifying theory of restitution because he
began by giving this up, not realizing that he thereby sawed away the
branch on which he sat. In Birks, for good or ill depending on how far one
thinks abstract classification should be driven in the common law, the
apparent logic of the promised unified classification drove the extension of
the restitutionary remedy to giving up situations. What drives the similar
extension in Edelman? With all respect, the last thing it can be said to be is
the theoretical integrity of gain-based damages, for this is, I repeat, a purely
empirical category.
In my opinion, which I shall state baldly, the driving impetus behind
Edelman’s work, and the general attitude it expresses, is simply a
thoroughgoing dislike of breach, which is largely due to a failure to
understand its economic function or its legal form. Breach is seen as a
"civil wrong" by a "wrongdoer" which should normally be "prevented."
Compensatory damages very often do not do this, and so restitutionary and
disgorgement damages should be more widely available, with Blake being
welcomed because it makes them so.128 This is merely a simple view of
pacta sunt servanda put in fresh terms, if not in fresh thought. If one thinks
126. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (noting that Blake itself retreated from
this argument).
127. EDELMAN, supra note 120, at 189.
128. Id. ch. 5.
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the law of remedies for breach of contract should recognize "powerful
arguments for treating breach of contract in the same way as other
wrongs"129 and therefore try to prevent those breaches, then that law is
inexplicable except as markedly incompetent, and Edelman’s discussion of
breach of contract continuously exudes puzzlement over just this. This
puzzlement is what is left if one wants to prevent breach, but is sufficiently
learned in the law to know that the existing law of breach of contract does
not normally seek actually to prevent breach,130 and is also sufficiently
scrupulous not to just attempt to ride roughshod over the "obstacles" posed
by the existing law.131
If one gives up Birks’s classificatory scheme, then, unless one comes
up with another theoretical scheme, one is left without a justification for
Blake. It is for this reason that Friedmann’s conception of a performance
interest which is to replace expectation as the theoretical foundation of
remedies, though it does not sit easily with a basically restitutionary law but
rather really rests on conflating contractual and proprietary obligations,132
129. Id. at 149.
130. The most graphic display of this puzzlement in the at-all-recent Commonwealth
literature is Charlie Webb, Performance and Compensation: An Analysis of Contract
Damages and Contractual Obligation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (2006), which
concludes with the following in the apparent belief that there is a shred of novelty to it:
If we wish to continue the current prioritization of compensatory claims, an
explanation is needed as to why the claimant is barred from enforcing his right
to performance. It would be more honest to admit that, in such cases, the
claimant acquired no such right upon contract formation. This would have farreaching consequences for our understanding of contract law and contractual
obligation.
Id. at 71.
131. Edelman’s discussion of exemplary damages clearly hearkens for the extension of
those damages towards a wider class of breaches. See James Edelman, Exemplary Damages
for Breach of Contract, 117 LAW Q. REV. 539 (2001) (discussing a Canadian case where
exemplary damages were awarded in a breach of contract case). However, in what we can
see is a characteristic style of argument, he does not just go the whole hog but tries to
identify, and then extend, a category of "extreme" breaches to which exemplary damages are
appropriate. Id. at 545. Now, this has the positive effect of making Edelman’s discussion a
model of restraint by comparison to a number of others, but it does leave the tricky problem
of identifying the extreme cases, and, in my opinion, neither Edelman nor the case law
around Farley v. Skinner (No. 2), [2002] 2 A.C. 732, makes any more progress towards
solving this problem than he or the case law around Blake has made towards solving the
problem of identifying the legitimate interest.
132. See Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through Appropriation of
Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 513 (1980) ("Contract
relations may also give rise to interests that come within the ambit of ‘property’ for purposes
of restitution."). Friedman continues:
The property approach is, however, relevant in situations where one person, in
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has been so often welcomed by the proponents of restitution. I will say
more about the performance interest in the next Part of this Article, but let
us put it to one side for the moment and recapitulate on the nature of the
existing law.
There are, of course, justifications given in the English law for the
"light sprinkling of cases" so important in Blake, and there are parallel
doctrines in the Commonwealth and U.S. law. However, all of these turn
on the breach having a more than simple contractual element, and it is this
extra element which provides the legitimate interest in seeking more than
compensatory damages. To repeat Edelman and myself, breach of fiduciary
duty is the clearest example. But there is no justification in existing
authority for what is done in Blake, which, as I have noted the Court of
Appeal has told us, "marks a new start in this area."133 The actual
justification for Blake, which, ultimately feeble as it is in my opinion, has
worked to a surprising degree, is Birks’s drive towards a unified
classification of wrongs which, in respect of contract, draws on the general
dislike of breach which follows from the common failure to understand its
function and form. This failure (amongst other things) has caused Birks’s
classification to fall apart. By now giving up those parts of the
classification which are most problematic, Edelman may avoid their
problems,134 but he also gives up the initial attractiveness of Birks’s drive
towards theoretical coherence.
All this convoluted theorizing tells us that there is nothing in the
concept of restitution that can coherently ground liability in efficient breach
breach of a contract, acquires a benefit not through the other party’s
performance but by the use of his own labor or property, or by saving the
expenses that performance would require. The question of restitution arises
when such a person could not have derived this benefit but for his breach of the
contract.
Id.
133. Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enter. Inc., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 323, [16].
134. It is, in my opinion, better to say he merely defers consideration of the problems,
for, of course, one can do without the sliding scale, but if one nevertheless wants
restitutionary (hypothetical release or partial disgorgement after Wrotham Park) damages
and disgorgement (account of profits or total disgorgement after Blake) damages, one still
has to say when each are available, and Edelman does not manage to do this. This all
emerges from Professor Burrows’s criticisms of Edelman, made with the sliding scale in
mind. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 461–62 ("Edelman’s thesis is particularly hard to
reconcile with the law on restitution for breach of contract. No distinction was drawn by the
House of Lords between ‘disgorgement damages’ and ‘restitutionary damages’ and, contrary
to Edelman’s thesis, there was no indication that . . . less restrictive criteria should apply [to
the latter].").
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cases. And, indeed, what lies behind the theorizing, behind Wrotham Park
and Blake, and behind Section 39, is not the concept of restitution but the
concept of a wrong. Perhaps "concept" is itself the wrong word, if I might
put it this way. We really are dealing with something much more visceral
than a concept. We are dealing with the feeling that breach is wrong. And
the problem with the criticism of efficient breach in general, and Section 39
in particular, is that it is actually this feeling that is utterly wrong. To see
why, we must find out the reason why contracts are breached.
V. The Bad Man’s Attitude Is Cooperative and Breach Is Not a Wrong135
The negative attitude to efficient breach taken by R3RUE and by
Roberts is also taken across the range of contractual scholarship, including
by many of the leading proponents of the relational theory. Nevertheless, it
is, in my opinion, mistaken. The mistake involves unduly concentrating on
the Posnerian concept of efficient breach, rather than on the efficiency of
breach itself. For the very considerable attention which the Posnerian
concept has received is in marked contrast to the other form of "efficient
breach," though this form is far more important; indeed determining the
correct policy towards it is the most important issue in the law of
contractual remedies. The purpose of what has been called efficient breach
is to allow the defendant to maximize a gain. Macneil and others, including
Kull, doubt this type of breach takes place frequently; interesting empirical
research gives evidence that the notion of Posnerian efficient breach does
not sit well with the business community;136 and it would seem clear that
that notion plays only a very minor role in deciding cases.137 However this
135. The following section draws on arguments made in David Campbell, Breach and
Penalty as Contractual Norm and Contractual Anomie, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 681 and David
Campbell, The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-operation as the Implicit Second
Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 455 (2005). A
number of the central points I attempted to make in these papers have been independently
made in contributions to a symposium initially published in the Michigan Law Review and
revised in FAULT IN AMERICAN LAW (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010). I have not
attempted to make the detailed revisions necessary to make adequate reference to this
symposium in this section of this Article.
136. See David Baumer & Patricia Marshall, Willful Breach of Contract for the Sale of
Goods: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 171
(1992) ("[S]urvey respondents overwhelmingly rejected the notion that it is ethical for a
trading partner to breach a contract deliberately because a better deal can be had elsewhere.
Respondents also indicated that the wilful nature of a breach would . . . substantially increase
the probability of litigation.").
137. See Craig S. Warkol, Note, Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and
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is, it is essential to see that, far more important than this maximizing
breach, is the breach which has the purpose of minimizing loss.138 This is,
indeed, the typical case of breach, though not generally recognized as such.
When the defendant undertakes a primary contractual obligation, he
does so in the belief that performance of that obligation will cost a certain
amount. That this belief inevitably will be based on bounded rationality at
the time of the agreement means that a risk always attends a contractual
undertaking.139 One risk is the Posnerian efficient-breach risk that, even if
the original contract goes as planned, a better contract could have been
made. In other cases, however, the risk that the original contract does not
go as planned becomes manifested in a rise of the costs the defendant incurs
in performing. Any rise in the cost of complete performance above the
defendant’s original estimate will reduce the defendant’s expected profit
margin, and thus the defendant’s own expectation interest, and beyond a
certain point the rise will extinguish that margin completely (leaving the
defendant in a "break-even" contract, where receipts equal costs), or make
the margin negative (leaving the defendant in a "losing contract," where
receipts are lower than costs). The enormous variation in the empirical
circumstances which give rise to these outcomes—unanticipated shortage
of raw materials, destruction of premises by fire, etc.—should not obscure
the fact that (the terms not being in dispute) it is always a rise (or an
anticipated rise) in the cost of performance that gives the good faith
defendant an incentive to breach.140
The allocation of risks to the parties takes place within certain limits to
the extent to which any defendant can be required to absorb risk. There is a
fundamental limit to the extent to which the defendant could be obliged to
perform even when his costs are rising which is set by the possibility of his
becoming bankrupt or going into liquidation. There is a lower limit set by
Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
321, 334 (1998) ("With a few notable exceptions, most judges do not explicitly adhere to the
precepts of the theory of efficient breach in their decisions. In cases where judges could
apply the theory of efficient breach to strengthen their conclusions, they often fail to do so."
(citations omitted)).
138. Cf. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 263–69 (5th ed.
2008) (discussing the distinction between the "fortunate" and the "unfortunate"
contingency).
139. Campbell, Relational Constitution, supra note 135, at 463.
140. Id. at 464. In his comments on the draft of this Article, Professor Shupack has
rightly raised examples that seem to be counter-evidence to this claim, but he allows they are
marginal, and I will ignore them because I believe them to be readily reconcilable with it,
but that it would be inappropriate to spend the necessary time on the reconciliation here.
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the possibility of the contract being discharged for reasons which in the
United States are treated as commercial impracticability or frustration,141
though discharge on these grounds is almost otiose because it is so rarely
granted. In the great majority of cases, however, a more relevant limit is
set, and the general possibility of breach created, by the quantification of
damages according to the expectation principle. When the costs of
performance exceed the costs of breach, the defendant has a rational
incentive to breach. Because the costs of breach are the defendant’s and the
plaintiff’s lost expectation and wasted reliance, the costs of breach can be
lower than the costs of performance only if damages are normally
quantified on a compensatory basis and there is an incentive to mitigate so
that the plaintiff is compensated only for lost net profit; or, to put it the
other way around, only if literal enforcement is an exceptional remedy.
That the remedies system is like this has the result that the most important
sensible course of action for the plaintiff after breach normally is to take
commercial cover by finding a substitute and being compensated for his net
loss, if any. Exceptions to the basic position must be considered when
cover is inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s expectation.
If the damages system works in the sense that damages actually are
adequate, the plaintiff should be indifferent whether the defendant pays
damages or performs. The issue should be whether the defendant be made
to perform or to pay compensatory damages when both protect the
plaintiff’s expectation; and, if the defendant decides that breach is a less
costly way of doing this than performance, then the defendant should be
allowed to breach. To compel the defendant to perform will protect the
plaintiff’s expectation, but ex hypothesi, damages will do this more cheaply
than literal enforcement. As no benefit will be conferred by making the
defendant protect the plaintiff’s expectation by the more expensive method
of literal enforcement, the defendant should be allowed to elect the cheaper
method.
Nor is this a matter of being unilaterally generous to the defendant.
As rational pricing requires the parties to include the cost of potential
liability for breach, the plaintiff will benefit from a price lowered because
mitigation lowers the cost of liability.142 I will argue below that it is
competition over this aspect of contracting that has made contracts which
141. Id. The analogues to these pleas of excuse in the law of England, Wales, and other
commonwealth jurisdictions are by no means completely congruent with the U.S. law.
142. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 657 (1988) ("By definition, a cost-effective act of
mitigation will reduce the seller’s liability by more than the act costs the buyer . . . .").
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minimize liability the norm, and that this is reflected in the expectation
principle being the default rule of remedies. To do otherwise than adopt
what Goetz and Scott have called this "principle of joint-cost
minimization"143 of loss would be to impose pointless waste on the parties
which they themselves normally avoid.
It is in this context that something useful might be said about
Friedman’s performance interest. Here is the key passage in his influential
article:
The essence of contract is performance. Contracts are made in order to
be performed. This is usually the one and only ground for their
formation . . . . This interest in getting the promised performance . . .
the performance interest . . . is the only pure contractual interest [and] is
protected by specific remedies, which aim at granting the innocent party
the very performance promised to him, and by substitutional
remedies.144

This passage seems to be taken to be axiomatic in most of the current
literature, but, in my opinion, it contains as many serious fallacies about
contracts and remedies as it would be possible to cram into so small a
space. Contracts are not made in order to be performed. It is promises to
exchange that are made in order to be performed. The primary obligations
under the contract are promises to exchange and are a matter of economics.
Contracts are made in order to obtain legal security against nonperformance
by generating latent secondary obligations to provide a remedy in the event
of breach. Of course, when parties express their promises to exchange in
the form of a contract, it is (to some extent) in the contract that the parties
specify their mutual primary obligations, but those promises could be
expressed in other ways, and the decision to express them in the form of a
legally enforceable contract entirely rests on the attempt to obtain the
security of a remedy in the event of breach. The essence of contract is,
then, not performance but (breach and) remedy.
143. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 972–73 (1983). Schwartz’s
interesting advocacy of wider use of specific performance is readily reconcilable with this
stance, for it does not envisage actual literal enforcement being the result of his suggestion
but believes, generally wrongly in my view, that post-breach negotiations will be improved
if that suggestion is adopted. See Allan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89
YALE L.J. 271 (1979). See also the valuable comment Timothy J. Muris, The Costs of Freely
Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1053.
144. Daniel Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages, 111 LAW Q.
REV. 628, 629 (1995); cf. Friedmann, supra note 75, at 6–7 (offering a criticism of efficient
breach).

A RELATIONAL CRITIQUE OF § 39

1097

And once this is realized, then another point follows. When one
wishes to understand and properly evaluate the contract remedies system, it
is absolutely vital to appreciate that, in complete contradiction of the literal
understanding of pacta sunt servanda and its modern statement in the
performance interest, it does not necessarily matter to commercial parties
whether the primary obligation is performed or enforced. The legal
institution of contract is the general form of regulation of economic
exchange, but, in a most important sense, the legal institution is not what is
essential. It is the economic exchange, and particularly the surplus that the
parties intend to realize through their exchange, that is essential. The actual
performance of the contract is incidental to the obtaining of the surplus,
indeed it is a cost of obtaining that surplus, and an understanding of
contract remedies turns on seeing that expectation of surplus is what
matters, not actual performance of the obligation. In a contract which is
performed, expectation is protected by performance. In a contract which is
breached in good faith, something has happened to make performance more
costly, and though the overriding goal remains protection of the plaintiff’s
expectation, this should be done as cheaply as possible, and alternatives to
performance should be considered. Both the law of contract’s general
recourse to compensatory damages rather than literal enforcement and its
mitigating principles of quantification of damages can be explained only on
this basis. In sum, we might say that the fundamental goal of the law of
contract is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the
contract been performed (that is, to protect the plaintiff’s expectation), but
by the means which imposes least cost on the defendant. As it has been put
by Andersen:
[R]emedies for breach of contract . . . attempt to accommodate two
competing goals: (1) securing to the injured party the benefit of [the]
bargain, (2) without imposing unnecessary costs on the breaching
party.145

In the law of England and Wales, the "first principle" of contract
damages is stated as "the rule in Robinson v. Harman": "where a party
sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do
it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the
145. Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV.
299, 306 (1988). One might say that the first, compensation principle of damages is
supplemented by a second, efficiency principle, in an instance of the common law’s
combination of compensation and efficiency discussed in Cooter’s seminal article. Robert
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1985).
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contract had been performed."146 By stressing that the aim is to put the
plaintiff where he would have been had the contract been performed, the
rule in Robinson v. Harman makes protection of future expectation the
basis of compensatory damages. In Robinson v. Harman itself, a defendant
who had failed to convey a lease was liable not merely for the plaintiff’s
wasted expenses (in modern terms, reliance loss), but also for the extra cost
of leasing a similar property from a third party (in modern terms,
expectation loss).147 The principal significance of Robinson v. Harman was
that it did expand the defendant’s liability, which had been thought
normally to extend only to reliance loss in cases of its sort, to include
expectation. But this expansion was carried out in the way sympathetic to
the defendant with which we are now familiar. The expectation loss was
calculated as the difference in the rent of the third party’s property minus
the contracted rent,148 i.e., in modern terms, market damages when, to
labour the point, the plaintiff mitigates by securing a substitute.
I submit that the full significance of Robinson v. Harman lies in its
articulation of two principles of contract damages: protection of the
plaintiff’s expectation, but protection in such a way as to minimize the
defendant’s expense. If the protection of the plaintiff’s expectation were
the only aim of the system of remedies, it would be impossible to say why,
for example, that system requires mitigation by the plaintiff rather than
simply allowing the plaintiff to let his consequential losses mount up, for
either would protect the plaintiff’s expectation. The same could be said of
all the choices of remedies which flesh out the preference for compensation
over literal enforcement.149 To obtain a basic explanation of the system of
remedies, one must see that Robinson v. Harman itself expresses the two
rules set out by Andersen, and together these rules articulate the cooperative
project of joint cost minimization within a contractual framework.
The immediate distinctness of the parties to a contract is recognized in
the first rule in Robinson v. Harman, indicating a general privileging of the
plaintiff’s over the defendant’s interests. The ultimate cooperation of those
146. Robinson v. Harmon, (1848) 1 Ex. 850, 855. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981) ("[H]is interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed . . . .");
U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2004) ("[T]he aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed . . . .").
147. Robinson, (1848) 1 Ex. at 854–56.
148. Id. at 851.
149. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970).
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parties, both within the instant contract and in the economy over time, is
recognized by the second rule. If one looks only at the first rule, focusing
solely on the protection of the plaintiff’s interests, the law of compensatory
damages is inexplicable, or explicable only as seriously defective. It is
therefore not surprising that the characteristic shortcoming of insistence
upon the performance interest is that it cannot even see the existence of the
second rule, except indirectly as defects in the system of remedies. It is a
shortcoming of relational theory that it does not see that the second rule,
though giving an incentive to breach, is basically cooperative.
In a number of my papers on this topic seeking to demonstrate why
these two rules have been developed, and in particular why the second
complements the first, I have, at considerable risk of exposing myself to
ridicule, quoted a passage from one of John von Neumann’s papers which
have proved to be the foundations of modern computing, which I attempted
to read when trying to come to terms with game theory. I quote it once
again:
Error is viewed . . . not as an extraneous and misdirected or misdirecting
accident, but as an essential part of the process under consideration—its
importance . . . being fully comparable to that of the factor which is
normally considered, the intended and correct logical structure.150

Much of von Neumann’s paper is incomprehensible to me, but insofar as I
understand the matter, one of von Neumann’s contributions to the
conceptualisation of computing problems was to recognize that error is
ineliminable,151 and the goal of eliminating error from calculation was
illusory. One should first be aware of this, and so not put excessive faith in
one’s results, and then try to manage the inevitable failure. In computing,
von Neumann’s basic strategy was to duplicate the calculation on various
computers (or parts of computers) and work from some sample of the
multiple results.
Without wishing to put any weight on what is intended purely as a
heuristic device, I submit that an analogue to this happens in the market
economies. It is obvious that in those economies, composed of countless
numbers of exchanges of varying degrees of complexity, dealing with those
inevitably occurring contracts in which one party finds his costs during
150. John von Neumann, Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of Reliable Organisms
from Unreliable Components, in AUTOMATA STUDIES 43 (C.E. Shannon & J. McCarthy eds.,
1956).
151. The mechanical reliability of the computing machines available to von Neumann
was very much poorer than that of contemporary computers, but the basic point still holds,
of course.
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performance growing in an unanticipated way (telling him he made a
mistake (in the lay sense) by agreeing to this contract), is a major problem.
The mechanism for handling this problem is central to the efficiency of the
market economy.152 The fundamental mechanism is adjustment of
obligations by the parties without recourse to legal action, but this is
encouraged by limiting the extent to which performance can legally be
insisted upon in the way we have seen. It is breach that is most important
in setting this limit. Breach allows flexibility into the system of exchanges,
allowing parties relief from unanticipatedly expensive obligations when
further performance would merely be wasteful as the plaintiff can be
compensated in damages. In this sense, the major function of the law of
contract is to allow breach, but on the right occasions and on the right
terms; in essence, on terms which encourage plaintiffs to cover in the
knowledge that the defendant will compensate lost net expectation. This is
to say, properly regulated breach, breach which does involve adequate
compensation, is normative contractual action.
All this, of course, assumes that it normally is possible to take cover,
but for commercial parties this normally is possible because the market
economies are characterized by the ready availability of goods in
competitive supply, including a margin of excess capacity which allows a
buyer faced with breach to take cover. This margin functions inter alia as
the space in which inevitable misallocations of resources through contract
are adjusted through breach, or adjustment by the parties which makes it
unnecessary for the party experiencing difficulty to breach. Much
152. A comparison with the extreme rigidities characteristic of the centrally planned
command economies is useful. In such economies an analogue to specific performance
played the major role as a remedy for failure to comply with obligations under the plan
because satisfaction of the plan was the goal of economic action. See Bernhard Grossfeld,
Money Sanctions for Breach of Contract in a Communist Economy, 72 YALE L.J. 1326, 1327
(1963) ("The plan holds a central position in the East German economy. It expresses the
governmental economic policy and fixes . . . . The function of the contract, in turn, is to
implement in detail the directives of governmental policy as expressed in the plan."
(citations omitted)); Wang Liming, Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Law: An EastWest Comparison, 1 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 18, 18 (1992) ("Specific performance has a
particularly significant role in the law of contract in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
because it contributes to the implementation of the state plan."). Of course, as much as in
any system, obligations were entered into under imperfect information and with limited
computational power, and so their performance was subject to unexpected rises in costs.
Though a whole legion of semi-illicit devices for modifying the plan would seem to have
arisen (bribes to those who held scarce goods, lying about plan fulfilment, etc), the absence
of a general possibility of an analogue to breach to deal with these rises would appear to
have caused an inflexibility which was a major weakness of these economies. See generally
JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM (1992).
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economic theory which views "excess capacity" in the economy as a sign of
malaise simply fails to take onboard this vital function of such capacity in
making the taking of cover widely possible.153 This mistake is greatly
exaggerated by legal theories of the performance interest, which simply
have no inkling of the economic difficulties involved in their pursuit of
general literal enforcement, which would require the terms of agreement so
often to be right as to eliminate or greatly reduce the necessity of breach.
This is a foolish blanket response to the existence of bounded rationality
which will fail.
The point of relevance to us is that cover is both efficient and
cooperative in a way that undercuts the typical opposition of these qualities.
In circumstances when the plaintiff can be compensated in damages, cover
obviously is efficient, for insisting upon anything else would be to satisfy
the plaintiff’s expectation at a higher cost to the defendant than the cost of
the cover, and what would be the point of that? The breach is efficient in
this case because it minimizes the defendant’s loss. But this efficiency
emerges only because the plaintiff cooperates by taking cover. Allowing
the defendant to breach and placing the burden of mitigation on the plaintiff
enlists the plaintiff’s cooperation in dealing with the defendant’s problems,
one aspect of this cooperation being that it makes legal action unnecessary
in cases where compensation is adequate. In this way, the "efficient
breach" that leads to cover in order to minimize the plaintiff’s and the
defendant’s loss is, I suggest, the fundamental provision giving an incentive
to cooperation in contract.
If my suggestion is accepted, much of the empirical evidence, such as
we have it, about contracting, becomes more readily reconcilable with the
properly understood law than is often supposed. If the most detailed
formulation of the relational theory is due to Macneil, the arguments that
have made the necessity for an alternative theory to the classical law are
largely due to Macaulay (and his colleagues at Wisconsin), whose finding
of "non-use"154 made the classical law seem so irrelevant that, as we all
know, when Gilmore proclaimed its death, he named Macaulay the
executioner.155 The essential import of Macaulay’s conception of nonuse is
that the actual conduct of business, and particularly the resolution of
153. JOHN M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 81 (1961).
154. Stewart Macaulay, The Use and Non-use of Contracts in the Manufacturing
Industry, 9 PRAC. LAW. 13, 14 (Nov. 1963).
155. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 113 n.1 (2d ed. 1995) ("Professor
Stuart Macaulay . . . is no doubt entitled to rank as Lord High Executioner of the Contract is
Dead School.").
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disputes, does not rely on formal legal provisions so much as informal,
nonlegal understandings.156 But in the typical business situation in which
failure to deliver a satisfactory generic good is accompanied by a ready
market in that good, then nonuse is exactly what one would expect, not
because of defiance of the legal rules, but because those rules prescribe the
taking of commercial cover, rather than pursuit of a legal remedy in the
sense of a remedy which actively involves lawyers.157 Equally, other
apparently lenient responses to breaches, such as allowing repair or
(rescheduling) redelivery when complete rejection was possible, can readily
be explained as sensible responses to the limited extent to which the
plaintiff, even if he or she pursued the formal remedy, would actually find
that it took him any closer to literal enforcement of the defendant’s primary
obligations.
I hope to have at least plausibly advanced the hypothesis that, properly
understood, parties to relatively simple contracts relying on standard
remedies based on the expectation principle, those contracts which Macneil
would call "discrete,"158 typically have recourse to the "remedy" of what I
have elsewhere called "forbearance"159 when faced with a breach, not
because of nonuse as it is normally understood but because the remedies
point them in this direction. This is to say, the market apparently works
automatically in these cases.160 There can be nothing so certain as that this
156. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58 (1963) ("Businessmen often prefer to rely on ‘a man’s word’
in a brief letter, a handshake, or ‘common honesty and decency’—even when the transaction
involves exposure to serious risks."). Though my account of the operation of the law of
remedies substantially differs from that of Macaulay, which worries me, and is, as I have
said, critical of parts of his work, which worries me even more, I have gained great help
from his analysis of the "compromises" which are integral to Fuller’s conception of the
practical quantification of the reliance interest. See generally Stewart Macaulay, The
Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools’ Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 247.
My views on Macaulay generally will appear in David Campbell, What Do We Mean By the
Non-use of Contract, in STEWART MACAULAY AND CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP (W. Whitford
et al. eds., forthcoming 2012).
157. Professors White and Summers believe that the dearth of cases on U.C.C. § 2-712
makes it difficult to say with certainty how important it is. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, sec. 6–4 n.1 (5th ed. 2006). I am suggesting that it
is of the first importance, but this is reconcilable with the views of White and Summers
because it is a rule which works so well it does not lead to litigation. My suggestion cannot
explain the dearth of cases on the baneful § 2-713. Cf. infra note 174 (discussing § 2-713).
158. Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the
Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1025–37 (1981).
159. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, chs. 1–2.
160. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:
The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 259 (1979) ("The reason why Macaulay
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is not properly understood by the parties, which is an unsurprising state of
affairs when the position is not properly understood by most of the parties’
advisers; but forbearance is, I submit, the normal case. Revising our
understanding here will require not only a readjustment of our view of the
substantive law, but, even more, a readjustment of our view of the practical
use of that law. We have seen that deliberateness is a ground on which the
appropriateness of Section 39 disgorgement is assessed, and that
deliberateness is a questionable term. The problem arises, I submit,161
because "deliberateness" in this respect need not indicate bad faith. Rather,
even on current understandings, it could indicate a good faith party being
aware of his decision to breach, rather than failing to acknowledge
responsibility by believing that further performance is "impossible." In
Posner’s widely quoted words: "[e]ven if . . . breach is deliberate, it is not
necessarily blameworthy,"162 for the deliberateness may just follow from
clarity of thought. I would go further and say that, on the understanding I
am seeking to put forward, deliberateness should be viewed positively, as
consciousness of seeking cooperation from the potential plaintiff.
The vast majority of disputes are settled by direct negotiations between
the parties in which compromises are reached in the light of all the factors
which they consider relevant.163 The efficiency and therefore legitimacy of
breach, the value of a continuing relationship or of possible future business,
or, more widely, of a commercial reputation, as opposed to the one-shot
value of pursuing litigation most ruthlessly, must all be weighed.164 I have
described the potential plaintiff who, after breach, does not seek a formal
remedy, as "forbearing" from seeking a remedy in order to indicate that his
decision not to seek the remedy does not take the form of self-conscious
cooperation but of forbearance from seeking what, to the extent they
observes so few litigated cases in business is because markets work well for nonspecific
transactions, while recurrent, nonstandard transactions are governed by bilateral or unified
structures." (citations omitted)). On nonstandard transactions, see infra Parts VII–VIII.
161. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 19 ("Even if . . . breach is deliberate, it is not
necessarily blameworthy, for the deliberateness may just follow from clarity of thought."
(citations omitted)).
162. Patton v. Mid-continent Sys. Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988).
163. See Macaulay, supra note 74, at 465–71 (stating that "lawyers settle most [breach
cases] before courts reach final decisions" and that relevant considerations include the fact
that "[o]ne must pay for one’s own lawyer, and one must win enough to offset all the costs
of the endeavor" and "such considerations as the immediate need for money").
164. See generally James Shanteau & Paul Harrison, The Perceived Strength of an
Implied Contract: Can It Resist Financial Temptation?, 49 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1 (1991).
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believe in pacta sunt servanda, they must believe is an ability to compel the
defendant to perform. This is a giving up of what the potential plaintiff
perceives, however incorrectly, to be a right, for pragmatic reasons. For
though the overwhelming weight of evidence is that disputes will be settled
out of court by compromise, the present understanding of remedies
encourages a "vindication of rights" mentality in the conduct of litigation.165
The most aggravated form this takes, now deplored and intended to be
corrected by the last major set of reforms of civil procedure in England and
Wales, is the tendency of commercial litigation to
degenerate into an environment in which the . . . process is too often
seen as a battlefield where no rules apply. In this environment,
questions of expense, delay, compromise and fairness may have only a
low priority. The consequence is that expense is often excessive,
disproportionate and unpredictable; and delay is frequently
unreasonable.166

To this I would add that an otherwise valuable business relationship
subjected to the strains of the "resolution" of a dispute in this way is
unlikely to survive that resolution,167 which would appear to be a very
substantial and largely unjustifiable cost which civil litigation imposes on
business.
Businesses can, and perforce do, avoid these costs by eschewing
litigation conducted in this way, but the vindication mentality casts its pall
over post-breach negotiations in which reference to the contract takes the
form of exchanges of surrenders of adversarially asserted claims. The only
general present corrective to this seems to be the advice one imagines is
given very commonly indeed, that the law in practice falls short of the law
in books (in which the client would get his supposed full deserts), which is
a very unsatisfactory position indeed.168 Self-consciousness of the
cooperative element of contract is a necessary condition for improving the
basic quality of advice in this regard. Parties who are aware that the
165. See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 350–55 (1999) ("Settlement is the
preferred outcome of the parties in most contractual disputes, not some formal vindication of
contractual rights based upon a narrow and partial interpretation of expectations.").
166. LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (INTERIM REPORT) 7 (1995), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.U.K./+/http://www.dca.gov.U.K./civil/interim/chap3.
htm.
167. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, LITIGATION SUPPORT 1 (C.J. Lemar & D.R. Chilvers
eds., 3d ed. 1995) (stating "litigation will almost certainly terminate any future business
relationship").
168. See generally Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in
Theory But It Is of No Use in Practice, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 273 (1996).

A RELATIONAL CRITIQUE OF § 39

1105

expectation principle encourages cooperation would not have to learn this
by the expensive pursuit of vindication through litigation which is almost
always frustrated by settlement, which indeed is the unsatisfactory way in
which the ubiquity of compromise between good faith parties is currently
made known to those parties.
I do not for a moment want to deny that the expectation principle (and
certainly Fuller and Perdue’s statement of it) is in need of reform. But I do
think that its basic thrust is correct, and that what has misled business
parties and (neo)classical contract scholars and practitioners is that they
think primary obligations should be performed, when it is always
questionable whether they should. Of course, a party who breaches at all
frequently rightly will go out of business. He will repeatedly waste his own
reliance and fail to realize his own expectation, as well as be liable for the
reliance and the expectation of the plaintiff. But the necessity of allowing
for business failure does not tell us how to deal with the relatively low
incidence of breach inevitably sustained by all continuing businesses as,
indeed, a cost of doing business in conditions of bounded rationality. Selfconsciousness of the cooperation that actually underlies the properly
understood law and practice of breach would allow the displacement of the
always frustrated taste for litigation based in the vindication of rights
mentality to be replaced by a taste for settlement based in an
acknowledgement that the adequate form of self-interest always
acknowledges a role for cooperation. It certainly would be singularly
unwise to generally strengthen the plaintiff’s ability to adopt the vindication
mentality.169

169. Of course, as the restitutionary logic leads in this direction, one finds abstract
arguments for pure vindication remedies now being made. E.g., David Pearce & Roger
Halson, Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and Vindication, 28
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 73 (2008) ("Vindication describes the making good of a right by
the award of an adequate remedy. . . . [Vindicatory damages] are neither compensatory nor
restitutionary, neither loss-based nor gain-based: they are a rights-based remedy."). The
predictability of this development does not detract from its tedious circularity. Because
breach is a wrong even when it leads to no substantial loss, it is now argued that we need
remedies which effectively vindicate cases which previously would have led to a nominal
award, with the plaintiff probably effectively being punished for wasting the court’s time by
an adverse costs award. Id. at 97–98. But surely one can see that it is the persuasive
definition of the "wrong" that is doing all the work here, when what is needed is inquiry into
the nature of a "wrong" that the law does not normally seek to remedy. U.S. scholars will
find it difficult to appreciate just how far many Commonwealth academic and judicial
contributors to the Birksian argument are unaware of the progress that has been made in this
inquiry in the American literature. See generally, e.g., Webb, supra note 130.
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The bad man does not, I think, turn out to be so bad on this
understanding. He undoubtedly is oriented to maximization, but, properly
understood as part of a welfare-enhancing economy, this orientation is
incompatible with disregard of others’ interests, and is not individualistic in
any atomistic or solipsistic sense. He pursues his self-interest, but in a way
which intrinsically recognizes the interests of others. The bad man
recognizes that peaceful, proportionate exchange is the legitimate means of
acquiring the property of others, and carries out that exchange by means of
a law of contract which involves sophisticated cooperation with others. It is
cooperation within the law of remedies that concerns us here, but we are
becoming conscious that the law of contract sets up cooperation throughout
its doctrines, and that this cooperation is essential for the bad man to realize
his own interests.170
VI. Applying the Relational Theory of Breach to Section 39
The attack on breach that underlies the Birksian argument and
Section 39, far from articulating a superior moral position, articulates a
commitment to the vindication of the plaintiff’s rights which is inferior in
its moral quality and its economic effects to the cooperation articulated in
the expectation-based law of remedies. This commitment is not unbridled,
because fine scholars such as Kull and Roberts see that a bridle is
necessary.171 But their focus on the limitation of the restitutionary remedy
is, we will see, merely ad hoc, because their basic principle is a conception
of breach as a wrong which, as I have said, is itself wrong.
It will be recalled that the definition of a "profitable" breach given in
Section 39 tells us that "[p]rofits from breach include saved expenditure and
consequential gains."172 Though it is "consequential gains" that are at the
heart of the usual concept of efficient breach, in which the defendant
170. For my own writings on the relational constitution of agreement, see David
Campbell, The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract, in CONTRACT AND
ECONOMIC ORGANISATION: SOCIO-LEGAL INITIATIVES 40 (David Campbell & Peter VincentJones eds., 1996); David Campbell & Hugh Collins, Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of
Contract, in THE IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT 25 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003);
David Campbell, The Relational Constitution of Contractual Agreement, in THE SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: EVOLUTION AND DESIGN OF SOCIAL CONTRACTS 38 (Pursey
Heugens et al. eds., 2003).
171. Supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text (noting the need to limit the
disgorgement remedy).
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(3) (2011).
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breaches in order to obtain an extra gain, there can be no principled way
from the restitutionary perspective of distinguishing between this
maximizing breach and what I have called the minimizing breach which
results in "saved expenditure." Kull is to be congratulated for seeing that
this problem exists, which saves me from being obliged to argue the point,
as has been necessary in respect of the Commonwealth literature. But in
Comment f to Section 39, Kull goes on to argue that:
[T]he requirement that an opportunistic breach be profitable eliminates
most instances of breach. The basic calculation of compensatory
damages makes it highly unlikely, in any transaction for which there are
market-based substitutes, that the gain to the defendant as a result of the
default will exceed the injury to the plaintiff from the same cause.173

With respect, this is quite wrong, and perhaps the best way to show
this is by some examples that are intended to be absolutely characteristic of
a normal breach of a sale of generic goods when cover is available and the
case would be governed by UCC § 2-712.174 The defendant agrees to
deliver a consignment of standard steel to the plaintiff for a price of
$1 million. The factory in which he intended to make the goods is then
destroyed by fire, and, were he to try to perform his obligations by
rescheduling his production in order to still make the goods himself, it
would cost him $1.5 million to do so. These goods are available on the
market for $1.1 million. The rational thing to do is to breach. On
compensatory damages rules, the defendant will be liable for $100,000
market damages, that sum representing, of course, the excess of the
plaintiff’s payment to a third party seller over the contract price, and it is
rational for the defendant to breach because this is smaller than the
$500,000 extra expense which actual performance would cause him. It is
overall efficient that he do so because, whilst the defendant saves, the
plaintiff suffers no loss of expectation. I can see nothing in the wording of
Section 39, or in the previous restitution literature on profits from breach of
contract, including that of Kull himself, to see why the $400,000
173. Id. § 39 cmt. f (emphasis in original).
174. I will simply ignore the way that the availability of market damages in the absence
of cover under UCC § 2-713 contradicts my argument. Section 2-713 (and the corollary
seller’s remedy under § 2-708(1)) contradicts my argument because it contradicts the basic
aim of contract damages, incorporated into the UCC under § 1-305, and is, in my opinion, an
indefensible anomaly for which no satisfactory rationale has ever been provided. I will not
argue it here but, in my opinion, the only plausible explanation of § 2-713 is in terms of the
irrational persistence of conventional thinking of the sort that § 2-712 was meant to render
obsolete.
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($500,000–$100,000) is not "saved expenditure" following from the wrong
of breach, and subject to disgorgement. Of course, the breach would also
have to be deliberate under Section 39(2)(a) and damages would have to be
inadequate under Section 39(2)(c). But, in this context, deliberate is likely
to mean only that the defendant was able competently to assess his position
and not panic, and I will not say anything else about this dreadful red
herring. But the English case law allows us to say something about the
inadequacy of damages.
Section 39(2)(c)(i) tells us that "damages are ordinarily an adequate
remedy if they can be used to acquire a full equivalent to the promised
performance in a substitute transaction."175 In Comment c, Kull adds:
As a general rule, damages are an adequate remedy only if they can be
used to replace the promised performance in a substitute transaction.
Where such a replacement transaction is available, the promisee’s
remedy in contract damages makes disgorgement unnecessary; and the
promisor’s breach will not be opportunistic by the [Section 39]
definition.176

One can perfectly well see what Kull is driving at here, and why, by ruling
out the normal case I am asking us to consider, he thinks this will mean that
Section 39 will be "distinctly rare."177 But this is a terrible case of hoping
to have one’s cake and eat it too. The damages are adequate in these cases,
but only if the plaintiff’s protected interest is an expectation that is
quantified without reference to the gains of the defendant. But surely Kull
cannot be maintaining that this is how we should view the interest of the
plaintiff. If so, what is R3RUE’s treatment of breach as a wrong about?
There is a particular case that lays bare the egregious inconsistency.
This is the case where the plaintiff’s damages are nominal; the case that, as
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(2)(c)(i)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). Citation to Tentative Draft No. 4 was necessary here because
the wording of Section 39 changed slightly between the initial writing of this Article and the
final iteration of the Restatement. However, while the wording may have changed, the
essential concepts remain the same. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 39(2) (2011) ("A case in which damages afford inadequate protection to the
promisee’s contractual entitlement is ordinarily one in which damages will not permit the
promisee to acquire a full equivalent to the promised performance in a substitute
transaction."); id. § 39 cmt. f ("[T]here is no opportunism and no claim under this section if a
damage remedy affords adequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, by
allowing the promisee ‘to acquire a full equivalent to the promised performance in a
substitute transaction.’" (citations omitted)).
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
177. Id. § 39 cmt. a.
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I have said, has been behind most of the English cases between Wrotham
Park and Blake. Let us imagine that, in our example, the steel was
available on the market for $1 million. The defendant will a fortiori wish
to breach, but things are very difficult from the restitutionary perspective.
The plaintiff now has no loss at all on compensatory rules, and this is just
when the plaintiff’s being confined to nominal damages is regarded as
unjust, so it is impossible to see why this will not generate a restitutionary
claim which completely undermines all attempts to keep the restitutionary
remedy within sensible bounds. It is not good enough to say that he really
has no loss, for even if we establish that the plaintiff really is compensated
by nominal damages because he did not, in fact, suffer a substantial loss,
the defendant has not had to pay for the hypothetical release from his
obligation to deliver by which he made a saving of $500,000. The plaintiff
is compensated for normal expectation loss but not paid a sum in addition
to this for release, and the defendant is making profits by the wrong of
breach. (This is ultimately why the hypothetical release or loss of
opportunity to bargain concept is also so unsatisfactory.) It is utterly
incoherent to fail to maintain a restitutionary claim here, and one could not
do so consistent with the English restitution cases.
And once this is allowed, then it equally applies if the market price
were $1.1 million, as we originally supposed, for, as the $100,000 is the
plaintiff’s lost expectation, the defendant did not pay for the hypothetical
release which allowed him to make a net saving of $400,000 in that
circumstance. It is, I submit, impossible to distinguish these two cases on
the ground that in one of them compensatory damages are nominal; the
logic of disgorgement of wrongful profits must apply to both (and if it
applied to merely one it would still be completely unacceptable). It is
principally for this reason that I have called the Blake argument "ridiculous
in itself" in earlier work, because if the defendant has to pay for release in
these cases, commercial law as we have it will collapse.178
VII. Choice over Levels of Precaution
Reflection on the most standard case of breach shows, then, that to
hold that the aim of remedies for breach of contract should be the
prevention of breach is quite wrong and rests on a misunderstanding of the
working of market exchange. Fortunately, the intentions of commercial
178.

HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 267.
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parties reflected in the common law of contract are too sophisticated to be
formed by reference to this goal. Faced with the inevitability of breach as a
practical commercial reality, parties have not fruitlessly attempted to
eliminate it, but have contracted on terms which set the optimal level of
precaution against it, and their wisdom is institutionalized in the common
law of expectation-based remedies.179 This would be swept away by the
current criticism of that law that informs Section 39, which therefore cannot
respect the intentions of the parties. The most telling criticism of the
performance interest and restitutionary damages is that the stress they place
on performance would not be able even to be pursued as a goal unless
freedom of contract in respect of choice of remedies were abolished.
The institutionalization of economic choice in freedom of contract
requires the law to refrain from imposing its own terms into contracts, and
instead to strive to give effect to the intentions of the parties. That this
requires, for example, ensuring that the price of goods, such as the
$1 million for our steel, is the product of the parties’ voluntarily agreed
bargain, is widely understood (though this is a much more complex matter
than is usually appreciated, involving the state in much more than merely
refraining from setting prices).180 What is much less widely understood is
that freedom of contract also requires that the terms of the contract
stipulating liability should also be the product of the parties’ agreement, for
this is essential to rational price formation and the efficient functioning of
markets.181 For the "fully contingent" price of goods includes not merely
the cost of, as it were, the physical production of the goods, but also, inter
alia, the cost of bearing the liability which the parties undertake by
agreeing to the contract, with its latent secondary obligation to provide a
remedy.
Our argument now requires us to look at one aspect of the way that
compensatory damages work as the default rule in the developed system of
commercial law. The default remedy is, of course, implicitly stipulated as
the remedy which will apply in the absence of explicit agreement otherwise.
179. See Craswell, supra note 142, at 650 ("To the extent that the noncompensatory
remedies require a breaching defendant to pay more or less than the plaintiff’s actual injury,
they will induce an inefficiently high or low level of precautions.").
180. See discussion infra Part X (noting the role of the state in the system of contracts).
181. See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the
Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 108 (1989) ("Damage rules are no different from
any other terms of a contract. They should be understood solely as default provisions
subject to variation by contract. The operative rules should be chosen by the parties for their
own purposes, not by the law for its purposes.").
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In the common law, these implicit terms are the product of the
institutionalization of commercial practice in cases, guided by precedent
and amended by statute. Subject to some significant (by no means always
defensible) exceptions which need not be mentioned here, the commercial
law does not make it mandatory that compensatory damages are the remedy
for breach, but allows the parties to "contract out of" or "oust" this default
rule by stipulating their own "bespoke" rule governing remedies.
We can see the significance of this if we imagine that the steel in our
example was not a generic good readily available in competitive supply, but
a specially commissioned specific good with special qualities, and no
substitute was readily available for this steel. The seller’s failure to deliver
could not, in these circumstances, be met by covering, and breach would
threaten the buyer with consequential loss. As Kull and Roberts insist as
part of their cases for Section 39, the causation rules, particularly the
requirement of certainty, could well pose the plaintiff serious difficulty in
obtaining compensatory damages in such a case. One might well concede
that the buyer’s ultimate net profit was, except in unusual circumstances,
going to be positive, but quantification problems may prevent the full
compensation of the plaintiff, certainly in his own opinion. The very same
causation rules which allow compensatory damages to work so well in the
relatively easy quantification of market damages make those damages
generally inappropriate to the quantification of "idiosyncratic" losses of this
nature. The potential plaintiff who negotiates in ignorance of this can well
be left with a very substantial uncompensated loss.182
A competent potential plaintiff faced with possible uncompensated
loss under the default rule will (having reviewed other possibilities such as
obtaining insurance from a third party) negotiate to oust the default rule and
replace it with one which imposes a liability on the potential defendant in
which the potential plaintiff has confidence. Within the limits imposed by
the law, he may, for example, require the potential defendant to post a bond
which will be forfeited on breach, or stipulate a fixed sum which the
potential defendant will pay on breach only remotely related to what the
other party would have had to pay as compensatory damages, or try to make
compulsory performance the remedy regardless of whether the special case
normally required for this could have been made out. There are many other
182. A good English example, in which the issues were thoroughly canvassed by the
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, the latter reversing the former, is Co-operative Ins.
Soc. Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd., [1996] Ch. 286 (C.A.); [1998] A.C. 1 (H.L.(E.)).
Though I will not go into this here, an interesting, significantly different position has been
taken in the hybrid civilian and common law system of Scotland.
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possible devices for securing "real," rather than merely "legal," remedies,
the devising of which constitute a most important branch of advanced
commercial law.
The device which concerns us here, which certainly is open to the
potential plaintiff, is to stipulate restitutionary rather than compensatory
damages as the remedy. But, of course, to get this into the contract, the
potential plaintiff has to get the potential defendant to agree to it, and herein
lies the problem for the potential plaintiff, and the source of the wisdom of
commercial parties institutionalized in the default rule. For the reason we
have seen, compensatory damages are normally cheaper for the defendant
than restitutionary damages (or compulsory performance), and in
negotiations in which this is an issue, ex hypothesi this is so, otherwise the
defendant would be indifferent between these remedies, and agreement of a
remedy would be straightforward. The potential plaintiff may wish to get
the extra security of primary performance that comes from making
restitutionary damages the remedy, but the potential defendant will want
payment for this as he is incurring extra liability, and so will have to take
extra precautions against breach, or obtain extra insurance, etc. He may, in
our steel example, contract with two suppliers for the necessary iron ore,
thereby greatly reducing the chance of failure of supply, even though he
will incur avoidable costs in, for example, warehousing the consignment of
ore he does not use making the steel for this contract. The range of means
of taking extra precaution are very large, but, the point is, all will impose
extra cost. Though the physical steel will be the same, the price will be
higher if restitutionary damages are the remedy because the liability will be
higher.
Now, if the risk of idiosyncratic loss is high, the potential plaintiff may
pay the higher price for steel, because the extra security, and ultimately
extra precaution, will be of value to him. But when the exposure is to
merely market damages in the normal way, the potential plaintiff will not
pay the extra price, because the extra security, and ultimately extra
precaution, has no value to him, as he can obtain a satisfactory substitute
for undelivered goods on the market. In our steel example, if the steel is
generic steel available on the market, then adequate security is provided by
the ready availability of a substitute, and extra precaution is pointless.
Depending on the extent of his exposure to idiosyncratic loss, the potential
plaintiff will be prepared to pay for extra precaution, and negotiation
between the parties will fix the optimal level of precaution. In extremely
high value contracts involving a high level of exposure to idiosyncratic loss,
such as if special steel was required for shielding a nuclear power
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installation, the potential plaintiff may be prepared to pay for as near as
possible absolute precaution, because this is the optimal level of precaution.
But in normal cases, in which cover is readily possible, such precaution
would be a senseless waste for which no-one would voluntarily pay, for the
optimal level of precaution is much lower.
The serious mistake made in the current criticisms of the law of
remedies is to think that the law is unilaterally generous to the defendant.
As I have claimed,183 it is nothing of the sort. It is as generous (if this
terminology may be used) to the defendant as the plaintiff and defendant
have agreed. The plaintiff can avail himself of a lower price if he contracts
on the basis of compensatory damages which effectively require him to
cooperate in dealing with the mistaken agreement by normally providing
his own remedy by taking cover, which keeps the defendant’s liability, and
therefore the price he will agree to, low. If the plaintiff wants to impose
heavier liability on the defendant, he can do so by negotiating with the
defendant to do so, and paying for this.
We have seen that, in discrete contracts, a form of cooperation which
seems automatic arises in dealing with the consequences of breach. This
automaticity is possible only because cover is the standard rational response
in simple cases. But in more complex cases, this standard response will not
work, and cooperation in these cases takes (or should take) the more
conscious form of explicit negotiation between the parties.184 I will place
this "spectrum" of forms of cooperation in the context of the relational
theory in the next Part of this Article. For now we should note that the
expectation-based law of remedies establishes a sophisticated cooperative
framework within which competition and choice over the terms of the
contract stipulating the remedy takes place, and an order of optimal levels
of precaution emerges.
The extent of the error of seeing the current rules as unilaterally
generous to the defendant can be fully appreciated if we speculate on the
consequences of changing the law to make disgorgement damages the
default remedy. The potential defendant contracting on this basis would
incur the higher level of liability and so would have to charge a higher price
183. See supra text accompanying note 143 (discussing the need for "joint-cost
minimization").
184. See David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual
Relationships: The Role of Co-operation, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 166 (1993) ("[W]hat the evidence
shows . . . to be the case, is that failures under [long-term contract] circumstances lead . . . to
extra-legal strategies to keep the long-term relationship alive in all but the most acute
circumstances.").
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for the goods. Competition would quickly lead to sellers offering to sell on
terms which explicitly ousted this default and replaced it with a bespoke
compensatory damages clause, and, in the normal case, buyers would
contract on these cheaper terms. There would be the extra transaction cost
of having to contract away from a default which is unsuitable in the normal
case (which is why compensatory damages now are the default), but the
ultimate result would be the same. The only way to prevent this would be
to make the disgorgement remedy mandatory, that is to say, impose it on
the parties and make it impossible for them to contract out of that
remedy.185 The contradiction between the abstractly legal criticisms of the
current law of remedies and the law of contract which institutionalizes
economic choice as freedom of contract could not be more marked.
VIII. Why Cases Like Wrotham Park Arise, and How to Deal with Them
We are now in a position to see why cases like Wrotham Park arise,
and to see how they should be dealt with. In Wrotham Park, the plaintiff
clearly believed that the restrictive covenant would bind the defendant to
building only within the lay-out plan.186 In this, he was wrong, and, of
course, this is why, as we have seen, the Court felt that "justice [would]
manifestly not have been done"187 by an award of nominal compensatory
damages. In all the subsequent discussion of this case, it has been accepted
that the Court was right, and Kull is so sure of this that, in Illustration 11 to
Section 39, he effectively tells us that Section 39 would endorse total
disgorgement of the defendant’s profit in Wrotham Park, a much better
result for the plaintiff than the small partial disgorgement he did obtain.188
185. I think one can fairly say that Birks’s thinking over this vital point is so confused
that one cannot say what just his position was, and one hesitates to say that he fundamentally
misunderstood (freedom of) contract. But there can be no doubt he was prepared to impose
"restitutionary rights" by "the operation of law as opposed to the consent of the party
enriched." Birks, supra note 3, at 44.
186. Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch.D.)
799.
187. Id. at 815.
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. e,
illus. 11 (2011) ("Landowner sells part of his land to Developer for subdivision; Developer
agrees to build no more than 100 houses on the property. Developer’s covenant to this effect
is valid and enforceable by Landowner."). The illustration continues:
Acting in deliberate disregard of his contractual obligations, Developer builds
120 houses. In a subsequent lawsuit between the parties, the court finds that
(i) Developer’s breach of contract enabled Developer to realize an additional
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But this is not right, and, indeed, is a variant of the incorrect understanding
of the working of the law of remedies which this Article seeks to address.
I have mentioned that Wrotham Park was not decided as a restitution
case but on grounds derived from nineteenth century equity jurisprudence,
and that the first modern rationalization of the decision was in terms of
hypothetical release damages.189 The first clear English judicial statement
of this rationalization was provided by Megarry V.C. three years after
Wrotham Park in Tito v. Waddell (No.2):190
[i]f the plaintiff has the right to prevent some act being done without
seeking his consent, and the defendant does the act without seeking that
consent, the plaintiff has suffered a loss in that the defendant has taken
something for which the plaintiff could have required payment, namely,
the right to do the act.191

I trust we can now see that, with respect, this is quite wrong. When a
potential plaintiff obtains agreement to a clause in a contract, he obtains
security against nonperformance of the obligation set out in that clause.
But, by default, that security, Holmes has told us, is the security provided
by compelling the defendant to pay compensatory damages in the event of
breach.192 By default, a contract does not give the plaintiff "the right to
prevent some act being done without seeking his consent";193 this is
precisely what it does not do. It allows the defendant to breach without
$200,000 profit from the transaction, and (ii) Landowner would have agreed to
permit the construction of an additional 20 houses on payment of $20,000.
Landowner’s recovery from Developer by the rule of this Section is $200,000.
If Developer’s liability in restitution were limited to the $20,000 that would
have been paid in a voluntary transaction, a party disposed to breach in these
circumstances would have inadequate incentive to bargain over a release from
the covenant.
Id. The reason why the recovery was so small in Wrotham Park is a good one, but it turns
on nineteenth century English equity jurisprudence to such an extent that setting it out here
would be inappropriate. It is set out in HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 488–94; and
Campbell, supra note 58.
189. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical release).
190. See Tito v. Waddel (No. 2), [1977] Ch. 106, 111–13 (finding that although certain
mining leases called for the paying of royalties "in trust" to land owners by the government,
this did not create a true trust or fiduciary obligation, and with respect to a replanting
obligation "that the damages should be more than nominal or minimal").
191. Id. at 335.
192. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 301 ("[T]he only universal consequence of a legally
binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does
not come to pass. [The law of contract] leaves [the promisor] . . . free to break his contract if
he chooses.").
193. Tito, [1977] Ch. at 335.
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consent, if he will pay for doing so.194 The whole hypothetical release
argument rests on a fallacy; the very one Holmes warned us against.195
However, this is not to say that there is no "lost opportunity to
bargain." It is just that the lost opportunity does not come at the time of
breach. It comes at the time of the original agreement, and really, one
should ask, when does one expect opportunities to bargain to arise? A
competent party has an opportunity to bargain, for, as we have seen in the
previous Part of this Article, with some exceptions, there is nothing to
prevent the parties ousting the default and providing for something more
appropriate, such as restitutionary damages.
The general reason they do not do this is the reason why this Article is
written. Most parties contract, and receive advice to contract, based on
literal belief in pacta sunt servanda, and, thinking that, by contracting, they
get a guarantee of performance of primary obligations; they do not see the
necessity of further negotiation to get what they really want. Should they
realize they are contracting on the default basis of the Holmesian choice,
they would do so. And, of course, a substantial part of being a good
194. Of course, in Wrotham Park there was the possibility of an injunction, and there
can be no doubt the plaintiff hurt his own position by failing to pursue this remedy in a
timely manner. The issue of the relationship of equitable remedies and restitutionary
damages was very thoroughly discussed in a line of real property cases between Wrotham
Park and Blake in which such an equitable remedy might have been sought, but I do not
think it fruitful to discuss this particular issue here, though I have examined it at length in
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, ch. 17. In an important sense, the Birksian argument in
contract (and even more Friedmann’s argument for the performance interest) is a way of
avoiding the existing limits on a plaintiff’s ability to obtain literal enforcement by making
damages to similar effect widely available as of right. See generally Daniel Friedmann,
Economic Aspects of Damages and Specific Performance Compared, in CONTRACT
DAMAGES 65 (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds., 2008). But the general problem
of denial of literal enforcement when the plaintiff, who in theory could be compensated by a
money award, fears damages limited by the causation rules will be inadequate pervades the
entire law of remedies for breach of contract, admittedly giving rise to very difficult, in fact
in my opinion impossible, balancing problems for the court, HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32,
pt. 3, only because the law very imperfectly recognizes the general principle of recognizing
the defendant’s, as well as the plaintiff’s, interests. See Campbell, supra note 62, at 141
("[T]he use of restitution to give greater protection to the ‘performance interest’ in contract
generally . . . ignores the countervailing interests of the defendant, principally in having
losses mitigated. Were Blake carried through it would have the effect of eliminating or
reducing the role of mitigation . . . ."). In his comments on this Article, Professor Shupack
has rightly said that these problems are known in the United States in relationship to cases
such as Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), and Peevyhouse v. Garland
Coal and Mining Co., 382 P.2d. 109 (Okla. 1963). I regard this problem as a large part of
the problem of uncompensated loss discussed in this Part of this Article.
195. See Holmes, supra note 27, at 462 ("The duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else.").
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contract lawyer lies in realizing just this, and dealing with it. Were a
construction lawyer who failed to advise his client to provide, say, for
binding expert third-party assessment of the costs of late completion, or a
commercial lawyer who failed to advise his client to stipulate liquidated
damages for failure to deliver a vital, bespoke component, to quote pacta
sunt servanda to the client left uncompensated after breach by way of
explanation of the client’s plight, he rightly would be regarded as
incompetent. Now, of course, a client who does contract on the basis of
pacta sunt servanda, only to find how misleading this maxim is, may very
well find himself faced with the uncompensated loss under Section 39(2)(c)
against which Section 39 is intended to provide. We have seen that
uncompensated loss is a serious problem in the law of contract, but it is
because, as Professor Coote has said, there is "wide acceptance of the
phrase ‘pacta sunt servanda,’" 196 when understanding the law of remedies
turns on recognizing there is no such widely accepted practice,197 and that
such loss comes as a shock in Wrotham Park cases. The remedy for this is,
not to have laws like Section 39, but for parties to see pacta sunt servanda
for the nonsense it is when taken literally, and deal with the problems
themselves.
The main arguments against Section 39 advanced here are that it has
no logical or practicable stopping point; that the stress placed on its being
exceptional by Kull and Roberts can have little purchase because it is
undermined by the very idea that breach is a wrong; that the English case
law has shown all this to be the case; and that, with freedom of contract, the
parties’ typical response to an attempt to make the restitutionary remedy the
default would be to contract out of it. We can now see that, in addition, the
consequences of granting the restitutionary remedy when the parties have
contracted on the basis of a compensatory default rule, and so have not
made provision for disgorgement, actually are unwelcome. The plaintiff
may well later wish that he had made such a provision, but, the parties
having contracted on a compensatory basis, it is effectively an unjustifiable
revision of the parties’ allocation of the burdens and benefits of the contract
to give a remedy on an entirely different basis. This has particularly clearly
happened in an English case similar to Wrotham Park, which defied as
clear a set of rules (based on an express provision of an Act of Parliament)
196. Brian Coote, Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest, 56
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 537, 542 (1997).
197. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 272 ("The basic remedy [for breach on contract
under English law] is not the compulsion performance, but rather compensation of the
claimant by compulsory payment of damages.").
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about the interpretation of conveyances of land as it is possible to conceive,
in order to give a Wrotham Park remedy on terms rather better than were
granted in Wrotham Park itself.198 On the interpretation mandated by
statute, the conveyance in this case did not even contain a restrictive
covenant.199 But this was no barrier to yet another English Court which was
determined to reach "a result which would appeal to the Court."200 I merely
refer U.S. readers to my discussion of this case elsewhere,201 and turn to the
famous case with which they will be familiar which raises the fundamental
issue: City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Association.202
Leaving aside the importance of this case in the United States, which
has led to Kull using it as the basis of Illustration 7,203 it has played an
important part in the development of the Birksian argument in the U.K.
Jones brought it to wide attention in an important article204 published prior
to Birks’s An Introduction to the Law of Restitution,205 and it had a
particular influence on the Court of Appeal hearing of Blake, where it lay
behind the "skimped performance" ground for awarding the restitutionary
damages which, Lord Woolf M.R. told us, "justice surely demands . . . in
such a case."206 But all this has been done despite the fact that the contract
was not breached in City of New Orleans!207 Kull, who acknowledges that

198. Lane v. O’Brien Homes, [2004] EWHC 303 (QB).
199. Id. para. [4].
200. Id. at [11].
201. See generally Campbell, supra note 58.
202. City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Assoc., 9 So. 486, 488 (La. 1891)
(finding that the failure of the Fireman’s Association to maintain the number of employees,
length of hose, etc. as required by the contract, was not grounds for any compensation to the
city).
203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 reporter’s
note d (2011) ("Illustration 7 adopts the facts . . . in City of New Orleans . . . .").
204. Gareth Jones, The Recovery of Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract, 99
LAW Q. REV. 443, 455 (1983).
205. BIRKS, supra note 3, at 344. In Birks, City of New Orleans was misunderstood in
the common way and taken to be "a type of case in which the test of ‘deliberate exploitation’
[Id. at 326–27] ought to be brought into play, so as to allow recovery of profits against an
unscrupulous contract breaker." Id. at 334.
206. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.) 458.
207. See City of New Orleans, 9 So. at 488 ("From the absence of any averment in the
petition that the fires were not extinguished, and from the documents annexed to the
petitioner particularly affirming that this condition was performed, we are of opinion that the
main purpose of the contract was faithfully executed.").
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his illustration "reverses" the result of the case,208 is unusually acute in
seeing this. Kull’s illustration reads as follows:
City contracts with firefighter’s Association for fire-protection services
to be furnished during the ensuing twelve months. The contract
specifies the number of men, horses, and wagons to be kept in readiness
at specified times and places, and the contract price is negotiated as a
function thereof. After the twelve months have elapsed and the full
contract price has been paid, City discovers that Association consistently
devoted fewer men, horses and wagons to City’s fire protection than the
numbers required by the contract. Association acted in deliberate
breach of its contractual obligations, calculating—accurately as it turned
out—that the resources specified by contract were in excess of City’s
firefighting needs. In consequence, Association saved $100,000 over
the life of its contract with City; while City suffered no increased loss
from fire as a result of Association’s disregard of the contract
specifications. City is entitled to recover $100,000 from association
[under Section 39].209

Now, this is an illustration, not an account of the case, and it departs
from the case in a number of important ways.210 Most importantly, in the
illustration "[t]he contract specifies the number of men, horses and wagons
to be kept in readiness at specified times and places," and by devoting
"fewer men, horses and wagons to City’s fire protection than the numbers
required by the contract [the] Association acted in . . . breach of its
contractual obligations."211 This is not what happened in City of New
Orleans itself, which involved a contract "to extinguish fires [and] to keep
up . . . equipments to a certain standard, so as to insure a faithful
performance," which was performed.212 Now, the City did set out a list of
"men" and "equipments," and the defendant did not provide all of these.213
But the literal provision of the items on this list cannot have been identified
to the contract, or the finding of no liability in the case is nonsensical, and
to understand the decision in the case it is important to see that the
defendant’s performance as monitored by the plaintiff seems to have been
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 reporter’s
note d (2011).
209. Id. § 39 cmt. e, illus. 7.
210. On the timing of the City’s discovery of the Association’s "skimping," see infra
note 232 and accompanying text (finding that the Association’s performance was monitored
throughout the contract term).
211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, illus.
7 (2011).
212. City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Assoc., 9 So. 486, 488 (La. 1891).
213. Id. at 486–87.
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found satisfactory by the plaintiff.214 Indeed, the plaintiff seems to have
failed even to argue a breach of the obligations which were identified to the
contract: "There is no averment in the petition that the fires were not
extinguished as required by the contract, or that the fire department, under
the control and management of the defendant association, was not
efficient."215
The reason this matters for our purposes is that it puts a different light
on what Kull is driving at when he says that "the contract price is
negotiated as a function thereof."216 In Kull’s example, and in the reading
of City of New Orleans in the Birksian argument, this means that a price
was negotiated which reflected the literal provision of the men and
equipment in the City’s list, on which the Association then "skimped."
Though the report is not as clear as one would wish, in my opinion this will
not have happened in the actual case, where we find that, perhaps
unsurprisingly given what we know of the case, the "Association was the
lowest bidder."217 In sum, in the actual case, if not in the illustration, the
City obtained a perfectly satisfactory performance at the lowest price, and
surely this shows the case is right, and reversing it would defeat freedom of
contract, for the negotiations proceeded on a compensatory basis, which
disgorgement based on restitution would entirely upset.
"Illustration 7," Kull tells us
[m]ight be directly explained, within the terms of § 39, as a case in
which the parties’ bargain would be inherently insecure if its
enforcement were limited to damages for breach. (Such a rule invites
the promisor to speculate by bargaining for one performance and
rendering another, calculating that its saved expenditure will exceed the
measurable difference in end result. This form of speculation—however
well-informed or ‘efficient’—exposes the promisee to unquantifiable
risks against which the promisee had attempted to protect itself by
contract).218

214. See infra text accompanying note 233 (noting that the Association’s performance
was monitored and a bond was paid).
215. City of New Orleans, 9 So. at 488. One can, of course, imagine an argument for
the plaintiff, such as that the amount of resource employed by the defendant was a source of
insecurity which was a breach, but no such argument was made, and it would, one imagines,
have run into serious certainty problems even if liability were established.
216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, illus.
7 (2011).
217. City of New Orleans, 9 So. at 487.
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. e
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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With respect, this is not the source of the problem in Illustration 7, much
less in City of New Orleans itself, for there is nothing in the law which
mandates that "enforcement" be "limited to damages for breach." In the
Illustration, the City wants literal provision of the men and equipment.
Were it competent in its negotiations, it should have realized that
compensatory damages were not going to do the necessary work, for
deficiency in the literal provision would not, of itself, cause a loss, and the
City should have negotiated for something it would have found better.
From the point of view of "justice," viewed not only after the event but
when, surely unusually, all the facts are thought to have come to hand,219
one might be able to argue that there is a deficiency in the remedy available
to the plaintiff set out in this illustration. But contracts are not made sub
specie aeternitatis. They are made in situations in which the existence of
positive transaction costs leads to bounded rationality and the negotiations
by which one seeks what one wants from the contract never give perfect
assurance that one will get it, much less that the contract will be "just"
(whatever that means). If one does not get what one wanted out of a freely
negotiated contract, one has to put up with this unless one can show a
breach (which also involves transaction costs). Part of one’s competence as
a commercial party is competence to negotiate in such a way that this will
happen. This, not entirely obscure, doctrine is called freedom of contract.
One can barely imagine the haste with which Lord Woolf, who placed such
reliance on City of New Orleans in Blake, would himself have denied that
the plaintiff had a cause of action were the plaintiff to have denied the
existence of the contract at all because the defendant had furnished
inadequate consideration,220 and that the contract therefore was unfair. Of
course, had the City negotiated so that it became plain that a remedy would
be sought which would (assuming it was possible) have secured the literal
provision of the listed men and equipment, the price would have been
different, and the better than compensatory remedy stipulated far more
likely to be awarded after breach. But this would have been a different
contract. In City of New Orleans itself, where the literal provision of the
men and equipment was not even identified to the contract, the disregard of
freedom of contract by giving the restitutionary remedy would be

219. See infra text accompanying notes 230–32 (noting the City’s continual monitoring
of the Association’s performance).
220. This is more, but by no means entirely, clearly understood in the most instructive
English case on "skimping." White Arrow Express Ltd. & Ors v. Lamey’s Distribution Ltd.,
[1995] C.L.C. 1251.
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indefensible. It is important for us to understand why the restitutionary
perspective leads one towards such disregard.
The basic argument of this Article has been that even in the simple
sale which is the paradigm, discrete contract is based on cooperation, and
that widely available restitutionary remedies would undermine this. In his
generous personal comments on this Article, Kull has argued that Wrotham
Park is not a case that exhibited much cooperation, and were this the case,
it would, of course, pose a serious problem for my argument, particularly as
it is based on the relational theory, for that theory is generally interpreted as
a very paternalistic theory,221 suspicious of freedom of contract and having
no or little place for competition.222 But, as I have argued elsewhere, this
certainly was not Ian Macneil’s intention,223 and, drawing on his work, the
relational theory can readily be restated in such a way as to give
competition a central place in it.224 In my opinion, a principal virtue of the
relational theory is the way that it can consistently locate legitimate
competition within a framework of contract (and other) law, thereby
avoiding the shortcomings of the purportedly purely individualistic view of
economic action common to the (neo)classical law of contract and
mainstream economics, exemplified in legal scholarship in Posnerian law
221. Kennedy’s rightly very influential gloss on particularly the work of Macaulay
seems to have played a large part in this, though Kennedy’s views are much more nuanced
than the title of his paper would seem to have led many who have cited it to believe. Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563
(1982).
222. See Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law,
9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399, 405 (2000) ("Relational contracting is out of step with today’s
realities if it is understood as the warm, human, cooperative interpersonal relation that
overcomes the cold economic instrumentalism with a communitarian orientation, as market
transactionalism with a human face."). See in criticism David Campbell, The Limits of
Concept Formation in Legal Science, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 439, 445 (2000) ("Macneil has
persevered discreteness and competition within a general relational theory, and has been
highly critical of what he thinks is the unacceptable communitarianism of those who do not
do so.").
223. See David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in IAN R.
MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 3, 20–27 (David Campbell ed., 2001)
("[T]his account of co-operation in relational contracting makes it imperative to give a
compatible account of competition, and in his developed work Macneil does so in two
ways . . . based on his concepts of the discrete and the relational contract norms and of
presentation.").
224. See, e.g., Campbell, The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract, supra
note 170, at 56 ("We should recognize that all contracts, including the discrete contract, are
relationally constituted and . . . the problem of securing optimal outcomes in all contract [is]
one of choice of [the] appropriate relational constitution." (citations omitted)).
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and economics. This is, perhaps, an occasion on which the value of the
way competition may be described in the relational theory may be
illustrated.
The relational theory posits a spectrum of orientations of contractual
action,225 from what we have seen Macneil call the "discrete" contract,
exemplified by the simple sale, towards what is generally called the
"relational," but which, to avoid an unhelpful confusion of terminology, I
believe it best to call the "complex," contract,226 in which the parties may
have many "intertwined," long-lasting commitments. This Article has
focused upon the cooperation largely unconsciously exhibited in the
discrete contract. In the complex contract, there is a much more developed
awareness of the necessity of cooperation between the parties.227 Indeed,
the existence of this awareness was a major stimulus to Macaulay’s and
Macneil’s development of the relational theory. As the complexity of
projects increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to specify contractual
obligations at the time of agreement, and provision for explicit cooperation
in the planning, monitoring and modification of obligations should be
made.228 At the complex end of the spectrum, cooperation may merge
towards complete identification of the interests of the parties, with the next
step, as it were, off the end of the spectrum being the abandonment of
market organization and its replacement by integration, as formerly legally
distinct stages of the production process are subsumed into one firm.229
How was cooperation to be established in City of New Orleans, which
certainly involved a contract towards the complex end of the relational
spectrum? As with other more complex contracts, it should have been
established by conscious cooperation in negotiations which the parties
undertook in the knowledge that the default rules encouraging automatic
225. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW.
U. L. REV. 340, 346–66 (1983).
226. Campbell, supra note 223, at 15–20.
227. Campbell & Harris, supra note 184, at 168 ("[W]hat the evidence shows . . . to be
the case, is that failures under [long-term contract] circumstances lead . . . to extra-legal
strategies to keep the long-term relationship alive in all but the most acute circumstances.").
228. Macneil, supra note 26, at 633 (discussing relational contracts as those involving
"significant duration," "the object of exchange typically involving . . . quantities not easily
measured," "future cooperative behavior is anticipated," and "[t]he benefits and burdens of
the relation are to be shared rather than divided and allocated").
229. See Macneil, supra note 158, at 1025–37 (discussing how as long-term contractual
relations endure, separate entities tend to merge, if not totally, at least for means of
production of some discrete good). Of course, the various persons involved in the firm are
by no means monolithically united in their interests, but the point is that the firm is
organized through a single authority.
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cooperation in the discrete contract would not work. And, indeed, this was
to some, but a limited, extent the case.
In Kull’s Illustration 7, it will be recalled that it was "after the
[contract period had] elapsed [that the] City discovers that Association
consistently devoted fewer men, horses and wagons to City’s fire protection
than the numbers required by the contract."230 One wonders how the City
made this discovery. In the ideal typical discrete contract, how one party
manages its performance is of no interest to the other party, and the parties
will remain in mutual ignorance about this. There must have been
something unusual, or at least not discrete, about City of New Orleans itself
for the facts about the "skimping" ever to come to hand.231 The report does
not allow one to be as clear as one would wish about how this happened,
but, rather than the amount of resource provided being discovered at the
end of the contract, as in Kull’s illustration, the Association’s performance
would appear to have been continually monitored by "a board of
commissioners . . . designated in [the] contract to see to its faithful
performance."232 The parties did, then, set up a monitoring structure (and
an assurance of remedy in the form of a bond).233
For the purpose of understanding the decision in City of New Orleans,
the most important point is that the monitoring does not seem to have been
directed at the literal employment of the men and equipment, but at the
satisfactory performance of the contract in the way described above, which
was approved throughout the contract duration, "[d]uring the execution of
the contract, the City accepted the fire department [sic] tendered by the
Association with the alleged deficiencies."234 Though the report is lacking,
as I have said, facts like these explain the decision in the case. But what is
most important for the general argument is the necessity of monitoring.
Though the quantification of compensatory damages may well not be
the simplest of tasks, the plaintiff attempting it is enormously aided by the
fact that, in the nature of the case, the loss is his, and he will be in as good a
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, illus.
7 (2011).
231. Even the very best English commentators have not paid enough attention to this.
See Hugh Beale, Exceptional Measures of Damages in Contract, in WRONGS AND REMEDIES
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 217, 232 (Peter Birks ed., 1996) (discussing City of New
Orleans and stating "later it was discovered that [the Association] had not [kept the specified
number of men, etc.] and had thereby saved themselves $40,000").
232. City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Assoc., 9 So. 486, 488 (La. 1891).
233. Id.
234. Id.
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position as possible to assess it. Restitution for wrongs is not like this, for the
plaintiff has to provide evidence of the (savings or) gains made by the
defendant, who obviously will not want to provide this evidence. The civil
legal system does in theory have the mechanisms for searching for and
compelling disclosure of evidence in these circumstances, but this process
can be extremely fraught and expensive,235 involving the use of court orders
which Sir John Donaldson M.R. (as he then was) memorably called "the
nuclear weapons" of commercial litigation.236
In practice, certainly in England and Wales, the plaintiff’s difficulties
are reduced because, to be frank, the courts have often adopted a not very
defensibly rough and ready approach to the quantification of what might be
called disgorgement awards. The excuse given for this—that there is nothing
better to be done—is correct ex post. But these proof problems arise in this
acute form only because the parties have not addressed them ex ante, at the
time of agreement, when a structure for avoiding them surely would be
sought by a competent party contemplating a restitutionary remedy. The
absence of such a structure is prima facie evidence that such a remedy was
not identified to the contract, and therefore should not be awarded. If the
courts were less prepared to be rough and ready, this would concentrate the
minds of potential plaintiffs wonderfully. It is highly significant that the
actual litigation in many of the English cases mentioned above, which have
formed what I have called the canon of the Birksian argument, have actually
been about the securing of this evidence after the event.237
Consideration of these practical issues does not naturally arise in the
English restitutionary literature, on which the abstract, theoretical concerns of
Peter Birks have left their mark. So concerned with abstract wrongs that, for
once ignoring the wisdom to be gleaned from ancient maxim, in this case
"ask a silly question, get a silly answer," the characteristic problem
235. And oppressive from the point of view of the defendant.
236. Bank Mellat v. Nikpour, [1985] F.S.R. 87, 92.
237. One notable example is the first instance proceedings in Experience Hendrix LLC
v. PPX Enter. Inc., Edward Chalpin, [2002] EWHC 1353 (QB) [48] ("Mr. Chalpin’s
subterfuge . . . in keeping the best and usable masters and copies . . . is unhelpful to his
cause. However, on this issue I do not think that the Claimant has helped itself and is guilty
of undue delay. . . . I am not moved to grant an Order for delivery up."). For a discussion of
this case see Campbell & Wylie, supra note 32, at 623–25 ("An important subsidiary issue in
Hendrix was the claimant’s attempt to enlist the Court’s assistance in securing the
information need to obtain an account . . . ."). See also the discussion of Teacher v. Calder
in Campbell supra note 35, at 266–68 ("Talk of that [restitutionary] remedy assumed that the
claimant has knowledge of the defendant’s profit so that he is aware of the possibility of
disgorgement.
There is, of course no necessity for the claimant to have this
knowledge . . . .").
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considered in the Birksian argument is the liability which would follow
from a hypothetical householder secretly watching a hypothetical window
cleaner mistakenly or speculatively clean his windows.238 (One is never
told why the householder who does not wish to pay voluntarily discloses
the facts that raise the possibility that he might have to.) Are wrongs to be
corrected only when chance leads to their discovery and guides their
correction, or would the wider availability of the restitutionary remedy lead
to the imposition of disclosure requirements, and a means for monitoring
compliance, with the attendant growth in transaction costs? That no real
attempt has been made to address these issues in the thirty-five years since
Wrotham Park shows that the Birksian argument is much more a flight of
academic fancy rather than a responsible attempt at law reform.239 As I
have said and am anxious to stress, Kull’s and Roberts’s attitude is of a
quite different stamp, but the problems still remain. The solution to these
problems lies in the hands of the parties, and we should try to make them
conscious of this in an instance of making explicit the lessons of contract
practice which is the general method of the relational theory. This solution
is quite the opposite of changing the law to match the parties’ current lack
of self-consciousness of what they are doing when they contract, expressed
in their troublesomely mistaken faith in pacta sunt servanda.
I believe that cases like Wrotham Park arise from a general mistaken
belief in pacta sunt servanda and from the problem of uncompensated loss
which, in an important sense, it causes. I do not doubt this is an important
problem; indeed, I trust it is now clear that I believe that excessively literal
belief in pacta sunt servanda is the principal problem of the practice of
contracting for remedies. But I believe that, far from changing the law to
try (and inevitably fail) to give effect to the mistaken belief, it is far better
that the parties themselves deal with the problems so poorly dealt with in
Wrotham Park and succeeding cases. In order to do this, parties need to
understand what they are doing when they contract, and this requires them
to reject their literal belief in pacta sunt servanda. Wrotham Park arose,
then, from a serious problem, which it is important to try to solve. But this
is not how Blake arose.

238. Reaching a pinnacle of absurdity in Peter Birks, In Defence of Free Acceptance, in
ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 105, 121–24 (Andrew Burrows ed., 1991).
239. See generally HEDLEY, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING, supra note 63;
Campbell, supra note 63.
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IX. Why Blake Arose
The most generous construction one can put on Blake is that the U.K.
government was so upset by Blake’s conduct that, determined to make sure
he could not profit from his memoirs, it ignored the good arguments against
bringing this action.240 Apart from what is said in Blake itself, there is a
considerable tone of outrage at Blake’s conduct in the relevant academic
literature, including the contributions of Birks.241 U.S. readers may recall
the emotional atmosphere that surrounded Snepp v. United States,242 a
somewhat tendentious reading of which clearly informed the argument
pursued in Blake.243 Leaving aside the costs and the remote prospect of
success at the start of the action, which would have deterred almost any
private person from bringing it,244 Hedley was to the fore of those pointing
out that there are many substantial arguments against seeking the Blake
remedy, even in Blake itself.245 There are many books published, say by
240. And even more persevering with it after what one must describe as a serious defeat
at first instance, when the public law aspects of the case were to the fore: Attorney Gen. v.
Blake, [1997] Ch. 84 (Ch.D.) 85 ("[T]he pleadings and evidence did not disclose any breach
of duty owed to the Crown on which the relief claimed could be founded." (citations
omitted)). Discussion of Blake, including, I must admit, my own, has typically passed over
the finding that George Blake breached a simple contractual obligation, even though it
wholly unpersuasive, in the belief that it was not worth arguing about once the case reached
the House of Lords on this basis. But, the late Professor Simpson eventually did what
should have been done a decade ago, and argued that Blake is per incuriam because no
breach of contract was ever shown. A.W. Brian Simpson, A Decision Per Incuriam, 125
LAW Q. REV. 433 (2009).
241. See Peter Birks, A Lifelong Obligation of Confidence, 105 LAW Q. REV. 501, 502
(1989) ("It is less obvious that a treacherous agent should be beyond the law’s reach in a
friendly state and one which both shares the same conception of justice and offers the
defector the same conditions of life.").
242. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980) (imposing a constructive
trust upon the profits of an ex-CIA agent’s book, which had been written without
preclearance by the CIA as required by contract).
243. See Birks, supra note 102, at 438 (noting the use of the term "fiduciary" in Snepp
in order to apply the constructive trust and stating that "the word ‘fiduciary’ urgently needs
to be purged of its over-extension. . . . [T]he time is ripe for an open acceptance of the
possibility of restitutionary damages for breach of contract").
244. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 266–67 ("It is impossible to believe a
commercial party would have risked the hazards of litigation whose success depended on a
major exercise of judicial legislation.").
245. Steve Hedley, Very Much the Wrong People, WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
(2000) http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue4/hedley4.html (last visited May 20, 2011) ("In any
event, was Blake’s breach of contract really so serious? His treachery was, certainly. It
doomed large numbers of agents to imprisonment or death, and it wasted many years’ worth
of work by British and other secret services.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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gangsters, that are similarly questionable, and there is no moral reason
corrigible as law for singling out even the contemptible George Blake. The
government’s outrage can hardly have been felt by all those it represents,
for, to the extent that Blake was going to make any profit, he obviously
could do so only if a large number of people bought his book. And then
there is the problem of having to deal with the precedent set for commercial
cases by this outré, if not quite unique, case. Sir Richard Buxton, a former
Lord Justice of Appeal, has cited Blake in the course of telling a cautionary
tale against judicial legislation,246 but, of course, Lord Hobhouse said all
this in Blake itself.
X. A Most Important Point of Clarification
It is obvious that my argument is a defence of freedom of contract and
the working of the market mechanism. However, in this case, as in so
many others, the market mechanism needs this defence because its nature is
misunderstood. It is my belief that the relational theory of contract can
make an indispensable contribution to improving our understanding by
providing, not only a theory of the complex contract involving conscious
cooperation, but also a theory of the discrete contract and therefore of
competition based on a cooperation of which we typically are not, at the
moment, conscious. The questioning of the current law of remedies has
gained its basic strength from its ability to depict the position in which the
defendant can choose to breach if he pays the price of doing so as
unacceptably amoral or immoral. At root, this is a criticism of what is
mistakenly taken to be pure economic action, with the breaching defendant
portrayed as committing a wrong because his economic self-interest drives
Review). The article continues:
But that is a judgment on Blake’s life, not on his manuscript or its contractual
status. It is most unclear how it can be said that Blake’s breach is a serious one,
and it is hard to dispel the suspicion that he is being judged by quite different
criteria from those openly stated. And the insistence that the Crown ‘had and
has a legitimate interest’ in preventing Blake from making a profit seems to beg
the question. Why does the Crown have an interest in preventing the publication
of the book, which it agrees is neither confidential nor prejudicial to security?
Id.
246. See Richard Buxton, How the Common Law Gets Made: Hedley Byrne and Other
Cautionary Tales, 125 LAW Q. REV. 60, 73–78 (2009) ("An admittedly exceptional claims
for an account as a remedy for breach of contract was allowed on the basis that the conduct
of the defendant was something like breach of confidence or something like breach of a
fiduciary obligation.").
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him to do so, in defiance of his legal, and therefore moral, obligations. But
this essentially legal approach surely rests on a basic mistake. For
economic action within the parameters of the common law is by no means
immoral or amoral; and its value lies in the fact that it is neither.
It certainly is the case that the (neo)classical law of contract and
mainstream economics display an, as it were, moral minimalism in their
attitude to the role of law in the economy, and this has been emphasized in
the unsavory aspects of Posnerian law and economics. But, save libertarian
anarchists, all those committed to market ordering acknowledge the role of
the state in channelling maximizing behaviour into productive lines to the
extent of insisting that goods may legitimately be acquired only by
exchange, rather than by force or fraud. The "enforcement" of contracts is
central to this; indeed, sometimes it seems to be all there is to it. But,
leaving aside the political philosophical objections one may make to the
various conceptions of the minimal state, I hope it is now clear that any
account of the enforcement of contracts as a rather simple matter, the
simplicity captured (and simultaneously obscured) in the maxim pacta sunt
servanda, is just an inadequate account of the law.
Though we have looked only at the bare essentials of the law of
remedies for breach of contract, it is obvious that the laissez faire rhetoric
of simplicity and minimalism is implausible, for even those bare essentials
involve, as we have seen, numerous complex choices between alternative
forms of enforcement. If we follow Coase’s definition of economic
regulation as "the establishment of the legal framework within which
economic activity is carried out,"247 then it becomes clear that a basically
negative attitude towards the state’s role in such regulation is far too
sweeping. For though the point is to regulate for choice, not to regulate for
the imposition of a pattern, the vital work of "framework setting" or
"institutional direction"248 necessary for choice must be approached with a
positive attitude, for inevitably it is a complex matter requiring extensive,
continuous regulatory effort, and recognition that what is being regulated is
contract as a spectrum of cooperative relationships (within which legitimate
competition may take place).
The difficulties of reconciling the other-regarding aspect of the
exchange relationship with the explanation of economic action in terms of
pure individual maximization are insuperable. We have seen that the law of
247. Ronald H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1977).
248. David Campbell & Matthias Klaes, The Principle of Institutional Direction:
Coase’s Regulatory Critique of Intervention, 29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 263, 265, 278 (2005).
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contract establishes a fundamentally cooperative relationship between the
parties within which competition about price takes place, and the optimum
levels of precaution and liability, and therefore a rational price, are set.
Without this cooperative relationship, rational price determination, and
therefore rational utility maximization, are impossible.
In sum, analysis of the basic legal framework for the sale of goods, the
paradigm case of exchange envisaged in micro-economics at all levels of
sophistication, from the high theoretical to the common practical, teaches us
that: (1) welfare enhancing competition must be based on an ontologically
prior cooperation between the parties to particular exchanges and between
economic actors in the market economy in general; and (2) the framework
for such cooperation, and therefore for defensible market ordering, has to
be provided by more or less complex regulation in Coase’s sense.
XI. Conclusion
The extension of a restitutionary remedy to breach of contract regarded
as a wrong has encountered all sorts of problems in the English case law
following Blake. A change to the law as radical as that which it was sought
to effect in Blake is, of course, bound to throw up problems on this scale,
and whether it is worth the effort of dealing with them will turn on whether
the change is worthwhile. In my opinion, the change effected by Blake is a
drastic mistake, and the problems it has thrown up have proven and will
continue to prove unsolvable because that change is inconsistent with the
fundamental values of the law of contract, principally economic efficiency
and freedom of choice, which boil down to the same thing.
The U.S. discussion of these issues is indebted to Roberts, who,
building on the excellent work of Kull, has set out the moral argument for
restitutionary remedies, and its corollary legal argument in terms of
modification of the law of mitigation, in a clear way. This moral issue is
what is of basic importance, and she is to be congratulated for identifying it
as such, at a far earlier stage of the U.S. discussion than has been achieved
in the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, she is, in my opinion, fundamentally
wrong. Expectation-based damages are moral, for they institutionalize the
cooperative response to breach that is at the heart of the success of the law
of contract. But it was possible to make so drastic a mistake about the need
for restitutionary damages only because the expectation-based law of
remedies invited it. The fundamentally cooperative nature of that law is
obscure, and was further obscured by Posner’s early discussions of efficient
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breach. In this situation, it has seemed necessary to criticize the
expectation-based law of remedies as undesirably immoral or amoral, and
to put forward restitutionary damages to give the law of remedies
appropriate moral force. This is wrong, but the stress on moral force is
right. Perhaps the fundamental service Professor Kull’s drafting of Section
39, and Professor Roberts’s observations upon that Section, will render is
making the moral nature, and the consequent value, of the existing law of
remedies clear.

